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I.	  Introduction:	  The	  Dispute	  about	  Dispute	  Mechanisms	  	  	  
  	   Since	  the	  1990s,	  the	  number	  of	  international	  trade	  treaties	  has	  skyrocketed.	  Many	  of	  these	  treaties	  include	  within	  them	  mechanisms	  mandating	  the	  setup	  of	  an	  international	  trade	  arbitration	  panel	  should	  a	  dispute	  between	  the	  parties	  to	  a	  treaty	  arise.	  In	  recent	  years,	  the	  number	  of	  trade	  arbitration	  claims	  filed	  has	  been	  steadily	  increasing,	  which	  is	  due	  in	  part	  to	  the	  increase	  of	  trade	  treaties	  containing	  trade	  arbitration	  mechanisms.	  	   While	  international	  arbitration	  systems	  undoubtedly	  provide	  some	  benefits	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  international	  law	  and	  order,	  some	  states	  contend	  they	  are	  being	  used	  by	  corporations	  and	  governments	  to	  challenge	  a	  number	  of	  important	  national	  environmental	  rulings	  and	  regulations.	  In	  fact,	  states	  such	  as	  Ecuador	  have	  recently	  withdrawn	  their	  signatures	  from	  treaties	  containing	  international	  arbitration	  mechanisms	  because	  of	  how	  these	  mechanisms	  can	  allegedly	  interfere	  with	  national	  sovereignty.	  Multiple	  constituencies	  in	  the	  United	  States	  are	  expressing	  similar	  concerns,	  objecting	  that	  the	  arbitration	  clause	  in	  the	  pending	  Trans-­‐Pacific	  Partnership	  may	  negatively	  affect	  environmental	  regulations.	  Thus,	  as	  international	  trade	  arbitration	  claims	  have	  grown	  in	  popularity,	  so	  has	  the	  debate	  regarding	  what	  role	  this	  kind	  of	  arbitration	  should	  play	  in	  society	  and	  the	  effects	  it	  should	  have	  upon	  citizens	  across	  the	  globe.	   	   This	  discussion	  centered	  on	  how	  arbitration	  rulings	  impact	  the	  earth	  is	  occurring	  in	  an	  age	  where	  the	  world	  is	  facing	  existential	  environmental	  challenges,	  such	  as	  the	  threat	  of	  global	  climate	  change,	  which	  makes	  exploring	  the	  different	  sides	  to	  the	  debate	  on	  arbitration	  all	  the	  more	  timely	  —	  and	  dire.	  Therefore,	  in	  light	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of	  the	  controversies	  surrounding	  arbitration	  and	  the	  growing	  importance	  of	  environmental	  initiatives	  in	  societies	  around	  the	  world,	  this	  paper	  aims	  to	  answer	  the	  following	  questions:	  Do	  international	  trade	  arbitration	  mechanisms	  undermine	  national	  environmental	  regulations	  and	  initiatives,	  and	  if	  so,	  in	  what	  ways	  does	  this	  happen,	  and	  how	  might	  these	  mechanisms	  be	  reformed?	  	  	   In	  order	  to	  answer	  this	  question,	  two	  specific	  forms	  of	  arbitration	  through	  which	  environmental	  policies	  are	  often	  challenged	  will	  be	  analyzed:	  investor-­‐state	  dispute	  (ISDS)	  mechanisms	  and	  arbitration	  between	  states	  via	  the	  World	  Trade	  Organization	  (WTO).	  After	  giving	  a	  brief	  background	  of	  arbitration	  systems	  as	  a	  whole	  and	  outlining	  four	  different	  international	  arbitration	  theoretical	  frameworks,	  I	  will	  apply	  these	  theories	  to	  four	  arbitration	  case	  studies	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  identify	  possible	  environmental	  inequities	  perpetuated	  by	  these	  arbitration	  systems.	  I	  will	  then	  use	  these	  findings	  to	  form	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  power-­‐based	  theory	  of	  arbitration,	  setting	  up	  the	  foundation	  for	  potential	  arbitration	  reforms.	  	  
	  
	  
II.	  International	  Arbitration:	  A	  Brief	  Overview	  	  	  
	  	   Walter	  Mattli	  and	  Thomas	  Dietz	  define	  arbitration	  as	  “a	  binding,	  non-­‐judicial,	  and	  private	  means	  of	  settling	  disputes	  based	  on	  an	  explicit	  agreement	  by	  the	  parties	  involved	  in	  a	  transaction.”1	  This	  agreement	  is	  usually	  rooted	  in	  the	  terms	  of	  a	  contract	  or	  treaty	  between	  the	  two	  parties,	  and	  in	  many	  cases	  the	  parties	  can	  choose	  the	  procedural	  rules	  and	  laws	  that	  they	  think	  most	  suits	  their	  interests.	  Although	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Walter	  Mattli	  and	  Thomas	  Dietz,	  “Mapping	  and	  Assessing	  the	  Rise	  of	  International	  Commercial	  Arbitration	  in	  the	  Globalization	  Era:	  An	  Introduction,”	  International	  
Arbitration	  and	  Global	  Governance:	  Contending	  Theories	  and	  Evidence,	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2014),	  1.	  	  
The	  Corporatization	  of	  Justice	   Novak	  6	  
some	  forms	  of	  arbitration	  occur	  solely	  on	  a	  domestic	  level,	  there	  also	  exists	  international	  commercial	  arbitration,	  which	  occurs	  when	  the	  two	  disputing	  parties	  in	  question	  reside	  in	  different	  countries	  and	  the	  matter	  of	  the	  dispute	  concerns	  business	  activities.2	  As	  arbitration	  lawyer	  Jan	  Paulsson	  has	  noted,	  “…it	  may	  be	  said	  that	  the	  international	  arbitral	  process	  deserves	  to	  be	  known	  in	  the	  plural,	  as	  
processes,	  depending	  on	  the	  particular	  organizational	  frameworks	  and	  environments	  within	  which	  it	  proceeds.”3	  Christopher	  R.	  Drahozal	  categorizes	  international	  commercial	  arbitration	  into	  two	  types:	  universal	  arbitration	  and	  specialized	  arbitration.4	  Universal	  arbitration	  is	  conducted	  by	  arbitration	  centers	  that	  take	  on	  arbitration	  cases	  from	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  industries,	  while	  specialized	  arbitration	  occurs	  in	  forums	  created	  by	  the	  international	  trade	  associations	  of	  specific	  industries.	  Examples	  of	  universal	  arbitration	  include	  the	  International	  Court	  of	  Arbitration	  of	  the	  International	  Chamber	  of	  Commerce,	  the	  London	  Court	  of	  International	  Arbitration,	  and	  the	  Arbitration	  Institute	  of	  the	  Stockholm	  Chamber	  of	  Commerce,	  whereas	  examples	  of	  specialized	  arbitration	  include	  the	  Society	  of	  Maritime	  Arbitration,	  the	  Grain	  and	  Feed	  Trade	  Association,	  and	  multiple	  other	  stock	  and	  commodity	  exchanges.5	  Some	  of	  the	  theoretical	  frameworks	  presented	  in	  the	  next	  section	  will	  use	  these	  kinds	  of	  arbitration	  as	  supporting	  examples,	  but	  none	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Ibid,	  1-­‐2.	  	  3	  Jan	  Paulsson,	  “Preface,”	  in	  International	  Arbitration	  &	  Global	  Governance:	  
Contending	  Theories	  and	  Evidence	  edited	  by	  Walter	  Mattli	  and	  Thomas	  Dietz,	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2014),	  ix.	  	  4	  Christopher	  R.	  Drahozal,	  “Private	  Ordering	  and	  International	  Commercial	  Arbitration,”	  Penn	  State	  Law	  Review	  113,	  no.	  4,	  Spring	  2009,	  1031-­‐1050.	  	  5	  Mattli	  and	  Dietz,	  “Mapping	  and	  Assessing	  the	  Rise	  of	  International	  Commercial	  Arbitration	  in	  the	  Globalization	  Era:	  An	  Introduction,”	  2.	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of	  them	  will	  appear	  in	  the	  case	  study	  section	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  state	  environmental	  regulations	  are	  not	  challenged	  in	  these	  particular	  forums.	  	  	   Mattli	  and	  Dietz	  identify	  a	  third	  type	  of	  international	  arbitration,	  but	  one	  that	  is	  outside	  the	  realm	  of	  international	  commercial	  arbitration.	  This	  form	  of	  arbitration	  is	  called	  investor-­‐state	  arbitration,	  or	  investor-­‐state	  dispute	  settlement	  (ISDS).	  It	  has	  also	  only	  become	  popular	  within	  the	  last	  decade	  or	  so	  and	  will	  be	  the	  type	  of	  arbitration	  analyzed	  within	  this	  paper’s	  case	  studies.6	  According	  to	  the	  Cato	  
Institute,	  the	  purpose	  of	  ISDS	  is:	  	   to	  protect	  foreign	  investors	  from	  economic	  harm	  caused	  by	  host-­‐government	  	   actions	  or	  policies	  that	  fail	  to	  meet	  certain	  minimum	  standards	  of	  treatment	  	   –	  up	  to	  and	  including	  asset	  expropriation.	  It	  confers	  special	  legal	  privileges	  	   on	  foreign-­‐invested	  companies,	  including	  the	  right	  to	  sue	  host	  governments	  	   in	  third-­‐party	  arbitration	  tribunals	  for	  failing	  to	  meet	  those	  standards.7	  
	  ISDS	  first	  appeared	  in	  1959	  in	  a	  bilateral	  trade	  agreement	  between	  Germany	  and	  Pakistan.8	  The	  stated	  intention	  of	  creating	  this	  mechanism	  was	  to	  promote	  foreign	  investment	  by	  protecting	  investors	  from	  discrimination	  or	  expropriation.	  In	  theory,	  ISDS	  helped	  soothe	  investors’	  worries	  of	  investing	  in	  developing	  countries,	  where	  legal	  systems	  were	  not	  as	  strong;	  this	  is	  a	  strong	  economic-­‐rationalist	  view	  of	  arbitration,	  one	  which	  sees	  arbitration	  as	  an	  efficient	  system	  with	  positive-­‐sum	  outcomes.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Ibid,	  3.	  	  7	  Cato	  Institute,	  The	  Investor-­‐State	  Dispute	  Settlement	  Mechanism:	  An	  Examination	  of	  
Benefits	  and	  Costs,	  (Cato	  Institute:	  2014),	  http://www.cato.org/events/investor-­‐state-­‐dispute-­‐settlement-­‐mechanism-­‐examination-­‐benefits-­‐costs.	  	  8	  The	  Economist,	  The	  arbitration	  game,	  (The	  Economist:	  October	  11,	  2014),	  http://www.economist.com/news/finance-­‐and-­‐economics/21623756-­‐governments-­‐are-­‐souring-­‐treaties-­‐protect-­‐foreign-­‐investors-­‐arbitration.	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   However,	  as	  a	  power-­‐based	  model	  would	  be	  quick	  to	  counter,	  the	  intentions	  behind	  ISDS	  may	  contain	  inequitable,	  neocolonial	  overtones.	  In	  their	  quantitative	  empirical	  analysis	  of	  over	  500	  investment	  arbitration	  claims	  from	  1972	  to	  2010,	  Thomas	  Schultz	  and	  Cédric	  Dupont	  found	  that	  until	  the	  mid-­‐to-­‐late	  1990s,	  ISDS	  was	  used	  “as	  a	  sword	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  economic	  interests	  of	  investors	  from	  rich	  countries	  against	  governments	  of	  poorer	  countries,	  but	  has	  since	  then	  also	  been	  used	  significantly	  by	  investors	  from	  rich	  countries	  against	  other	  rich	  governments.”9	  They	  also	  found	  that	  poor	  countries	  rarely	  file	  arbitration	  claims	  at	  all.	  Additionally,	  with	  regard	  to	  more	  recent	  trade	  agreements,	  ISDS’s	  purpose	  as	  a	  substitute	  for	  weak	  legal	  systems	  is	  not	  always	  applicable,	  as	  many	  of	  the	  states	  that	  agree	  to	  an	  ISDS	  mechanism	  with	  each	  other	  are	  not	  considered	  emerging	  economies	  with	  weak	  legal	  systems.	  The	  United	  States	  and	  Japan,	  for	  example,	  have	  well-­‐respected	  legal	  systems	  that	  multinational	  corporations	  utilize	  every	  day.	  Schultz	  and	  Dupont	  write	  that,	  since	  the	  mid-­‐to-­‐late	  1990s,	  “investment	  arbitrations	  have	  been	  filed	  against	  governments	  exhibiting,	  on	  average,	  a	  relatively	  high	  level	  of	  democratic	  development	  and	  rule	  of	  law…”	  However,	  it	  still	  “remains	  plausible	  that	  substituting	  for	  the	  domestic	  rule	  of	  law	  remains	  a	  function	  of	  certain	  arbitrations…while	  another	  important	  part	  of	  investment	  arbitration	  targets	  countries	  with	  a	  high	  level	  of	  respect	  for	  the	  law.”10	  Different	  lenses	  analyzing	  and	  critiquing	  why	  and	  how	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Thomas	  Schultz	  and	  Cédric	  Dupont,	  “Investment	  Arbitration:	  Promoting	  the	  Rule	  of	  Law	  or	  Over-­‐empowering	  Investors?	  A	  Quantitative	  Empirical	  Study,”	  The	  
European	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law,	  vol.	  25,	  no.	  4,	  (Oxford	  University	  Press:	  2014),	  1147-­‐1168.	  	  10	  Ibid.	  	  
The	  Corporatization	  of	  Justice	   Novak	  9	  
international	  arbitration	  functions	  will	  be	  further	  explored	  in	  the	  “Analytical	  Theories	  of	  Arbitration”	  section	  of	  this	  paper.	  	  	   The	  main	  provider	  of	  investor-­‐state	  arbitration	  is	  the	  International	  Center	  for	  the	  Settlement	  of	  Investment	  Disputes	  (ICSID),	  an	  institution	  created	  in	  1966	  that	  is	  part	  of	  the	  World	  Bank.	  Unlike	  the	  other	  arbitration	  centers	  previously	  mentioned,	  ICSID’s	  jurisdiction	  only	  covers	  disputes	  where	  one	  of	  the	  parties	  is	  a	  host	  state.	  As	  Mattli	  and	  Dietz	  note,	  the	  “explosion”	  of	  bilateral	  investment	  treaties	  (BITs)	  in	  the	  1990s	  contributed	  to	  the	  rapid	  growth	  in	  popularity	  of	  ISDS	  claims	  (see	  
Figures	  1	  and	  2	  on	  pg.	  10	  —	  in	  the	  first	  chart,	  IIA	  stands	  for	  investment	  arbitration	  
agreements).11	  12	  These	  BITs	  often	  include	  an	  ISDS	  mechanism	  mandating	  the	  setup	  and	  particular	  conditions	  of	  an	  ISDS	  panel	  in	  the	  case	  that	  one	  of	  the	  parties	  violates	  the	  treaty.	  In	  this	  paper,	  ISDS	  will	  be	  the	  primary	  form	  of	  arbitration	  under	  analysis	  in	  three	  out	  of	  four	  of	  the	  case	  studies.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Mattli	  and	  Dietz,	  “Mapping	  and	  Assessing	  the	  Rise	  of	  International	  Commercial	  Arbitration	  in	  the	  Globalization	  Era:	  An	  Introduction,”	  3.	  12	  Elisabeth	  Tuerk,	  “Getting	  up	  to	  speed:	  IIA	  and	  ISDS	  trends	  from	  2014,”	  
UNCTAD.org,	  February	  18,	  2015,	  http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Blog/Index/34.	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   Today,	  there	  are	  over	  3,000	  trade	  agreements	  worldwide	  that	  make	  use	  of	  some	  form	  of	  ISDS,	  and	  the	  United	  States	  is	  currently	  a	  part	  of	  50	  of	  these	  agreements.13	  Although	  the	  United	  States	  has	  not	  suffered	  substantial	  losses	  from	  being	  targeted	  by	  ISDS	  cases	  yet,	  the	  number	  of	  these	  cases	  is	  on	  a	  record-­‐level	  rise.	  In	  2012,	  a	  record	  59	  ISDS	  cases	  were	  initiated,	  and	  in	  2013,	  there	  was	  56.14	  	  	   Before	  the	  growth	  in	  the	  number	  of	  existing	  BITs,	  most	  countries	  settled	  trade	  disputes	  via	  the	  arbitration	  mechanism	  provided	  in	  the	  General	  Agreement	  on	  Tariffs	  and	  Trade,	  where	  both	  parties	  of	  a	  dispute	  had	  to	  be	  countries.	  	  	  This	  state-­‐to-­‐state	  arbitration	  under	  what	  is	  now	  the	  World	  Trade	  Organization	  (WTO)	  is	  the	  fourth	  category	  of	  arbitration	  in	  use	  today	  and	  will	  be	  analyzed	  in	  this	  paper.	  The 
WTO moderates trade disputes between member states regarding WTO rules, through its 
Dispute Settlement Body. Although these disputes almost always involve commercial 
interests, this forum of arbitration is different from international commercial arbitration 
and investor-state arbitration because corporations cannot be one of the primary parties of 
a dispute.15	  	  
III.	  Analytical	  Theories	  of	  International	  Arbitration	  
	  
	   Before	  beginning	  a	  discussion	  concerning	  how	  ISDS	  and	  WTO	  rulings	  may	  conflict	  with	  environmental	  standards,	  it	  is	  first	  necessary	  to	  explore	  different	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Office	  of	  the	  United	  States	  Trade	  Representative,	  Investor-­‐State	  Dispute	  
Settlement,	  (Office	  of	  the	  United	  States	  Trade	  Representative:	  March	  2015),	  https://ustr.gov/about-­‐us/policy-­‐offices/press-­‐office/fact-­‐sheets/2015/march/investor-­‐state-­‐dispute-­‐settlement-­‐isds#.	  	  14	  The	  Economist,	  The	  arbitration	  game.	  	  	  15	  Some	  BITs	  have	  state-­‐to-­‐state	  arbitration	  mechanisms	  like	  the	  WTO	  does,	  but	  these	  will	  not	  be	  the	  focus	  of	  any	  of	  the	  case	  studies	  in	  this	  paper.	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analytical	  lenses	  through	  which	  international	  relations	  theorists	  view	  international	  arbitration.	  Mattli	  and	  Dietz	  outline	  four	  different	  models	  of	  arbitration,	  each	  of	  which	  will	  be	  explained	  in	  this	  section:	  the	  economic-­‐rationalist	  model,	  the	  cultural-­‐sociological	  model,	  the	  power-­‐based	  model,	  and	  the	  constitutionalization	  model.	  Note	  that	  the	  examples	  theorists	  give	  to	  support	  these	  various	  models	  in	  this	  section	  sometimes	  relate	  to	  international	  commercial	  arbitration	  rather	  than	  just	  ISDS	  or	  WTO	  arbitration	  specifically,	  but	  nevertheless,	  the	  insights	  gained	  from	  these	  examples	  can	  be	  applied	  just	  as	  well	  to	  the	  latter	  forms	  of	  arbitration.	  After	  applying	  these	  different	  models	  to	  four	  arbitration	  cases	  studies,	  I	  will	  then	  build	  on	  all	  four	  of	  these	  models	  to	  form	  a	  comprehensive	  power-­‐based	  model	  of	  international	  arbitration.	  	  
	  
A.	  The	  Economic-­‐Rationalist	  Model	  
	  
	   According	  to	  the	  economic-­‐rationalist	  model,	  arbitration	  is	  a	  positive-­‐sum	  game	  that	  produces	  positive	  externalities	  on	  third	  parties.	  As	  Thomas	  Hale	  writes,	  “In	  the	  context	  of	  cross-­‐border	  trade,	  dispute	  settlement	  mechanisms	  can	  therefore	  be	  seen	  as	  providers	  of	  both	  private	  goods	  to	  firms,	  and,	  in	  the	  aggregate,	  the	  larger	  global	  public	  good	  of	  facilitating	  global	  economic	  exchange.”16	  In	  other	  words,	  because	  arbitration	  helps	  enforce	  the	  rules	  of	  international	  trade,	  it	  makes	  nations	  more	  willing	  to	  engage	  in	  such	  trade.	  In	  his	  study	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  ratification	  of	  the	  1958	  New	  York	  Convention	  on	  the	  Enforcement	  of	  Private	  Arbitral	  Awards	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Thomas	  Hale,	  “What	  is	  the	  Effect	  of	  Commercial	  Arbitration	  on	  Trade?”,	  
International	  Arbitration	  &	  Global	  Governance:	  Contending	  Theories	  and	  Evidence,	  edited	  by	  Walter	  Mattli	  and	  Thomas	  Dietz,	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2014),	  197.	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(NYC)	  on	  trade	  between	  countries,	  Hale	  discovered	  trade	  flows	  increased,	  on	  average,	  by	  30	  percent	  between	  two	  countries	  if	  one	  country	  is	  a	  member	  of	  the	  NYC	  and	  by	  63	  percent	  if	  both	  countries	  are.17	  He	  also	  found	  that	  countries	  with	  weak	  court	  systems	  experienced	  a	  stronger	  positive	  trade	  boost	  after	  ratification	  of	  the	  NYC	  than	  developed	  countries	  with	  strong	  courts	  did,	  which	  suggests	  that	  private	  arbitration	  and	  public	  courts	  “are	  to	  some	  extent	  substitutable	  for	  each	  other.”18	  Ideally,	  then,	  arbitration	  allows	  developing	  countries	  with	  weak	  judiciaries	  to	  attract	  foreign	  investment	  that	  would	  otherwise	  be	  unavailable	  to	  them.	  Thus,	  from	  the	  economic-­‐rationalist	  perspective,	  arbitration	  benefits	  the	  global	  economy	  by	  allowing	  for	  the	  optimal	  allocation	  of	  resources,	  thereby	  maximizing	  global	  economic	  growth.	  	  	   Regarding	  the	  question	  of	  why	  arbitration	  came	  about	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  the	  economic-­‐rationalist	  model	  views	  arbitration	  as	  a	  governance	  structure	  created	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  minimizing	  the	  risks	  and	  costs	  of	  international	  market	  transactions.	  Globalization	  has	  made	  international	  transactions	  grow	  in	  size	  and	  complexity,	  and	  thus,	  the	  importance	  and	  complexity	  of	  international	  arbitration	  has	  grown	  as	  well.	  As	  Mattli	  and	  Dietz	  observe	  in	  their	  description	  of	  this	  model,	  “The	  higher	  the	  asset	  specificity	  of	  a	  transaction,	  for	  example,	  the	  greater	  the	  governance	  complexity	  needed	  to	  promote	  efficient	  exchange.”19	  Additionally,	  they	  write	  that	  both	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors	  will	  select	  or	  design	  dispute	  resolution	  mechanisms	  based	  upon	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Ibid,	  198.	  	  18	  Ibid,	  198.	  	  19	  Mattli	  and	  Dietz,	  “Mapping	  and	  Assessing	  the	  Rise	  of	  International	  Commercial	  Arbitration	  in	  the	  Globalization	  Era:	  An	  Introduction,”	  7.	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their	  evolving	  needs	  and	  interests	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  ensure	  the	  efficiency	  of	  these	  mechanisms	  in	  quickly	  solving	  disputes	  between	  parties.	  	  	   Mattli	  and	  Dietz	  note	  that	  the	  International	  Court	  of	  Arbitration	  (ICA)	  of	  the	  International	  Chamber	  of	  Commerce	  (ICC)	  fits	  well	  within	  the	  economic-­‐rationalist	  model	  of	  arbitration.	  This	  particular	  arbitration	  institution	  has	  evolved	  to	  maximize	  efficiency	  in	  resolving	  disputes	  between	  parties	  by	  creating	  mechanisms	  designed	  to	  override	  potential	  obstacles	  that	  may	  result	  from	  one	  party’s	  noncooperation	  in	  the	  settlement	  of	  the	  dispute.20	  For	  example,	  if	  one	  party	  has	  a	  contractual	  obligation	  to	  enter	  into	  arbitral	  proceedings	  but	  refuses	  to	  do	  so,	  then	  the	  ICA	  has	  the	  power	  to	  appoint	  arbitrators	  and	  form	  a	  tribunal	  regardless	  of	  the	  party’s	  lack	  of	  consent.	  Furthermore,	  if	  one	  party	  does	  not	  sign	  the	  Terms	  of	  Reference	  in	  the	  arbitration,	  the	  ICA	  court	  may	  approve	  them	  so	  that	  the	  proceedings	  can	  move	  forward.	  After	  the	  parties	  approve	  the	  Terms	  of	  Reference,	  additional	  claims	  can	  only	  be	  heard	  if	  all	  the	  parties	  in	  the	  dispute	  agree,	  which	  minimizes	  the	  chances	  of	  one	  party	  presenting	  claims	  just	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  holding	  up	  the	  arbitral	  proceedings.	  Additionally,	  the	  ICA	  has	  a	  strong	  monitoring	  process	  in	  place	  to	  ensure	  that	  all	  parties	  are	  aware	  of	  what	  is	  occurring	  in	  the	  dispute,	  that	  deadlines	  are	  followed,	  and	  that	  the	  award	  given	  to	  the	  winning	  party	  is	  fair	  in	  relation	  to	  jurisdiction	  and	  the	  law.	  	  	   Likewise,	  regarding	  the	  ICC,	  one	  international	  arbitrator	  observes,	  “Most	  final	  awards	  rendered	  under	  ICC	  auspices	  are	  carried	  out	  voluntarily	  by	  the	  parties,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Ibid,	  8.	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because	  [of	  their	  high]	  quality.”21	  In	  support	  of	  this	  point,	  Mattli	  and	  Dietz	  write,	  “Indeed,	  only	  about	  5	  percent	  of	  awards	  have	  been	  challenged,	  and	  of	  these	  only	  one	  in	  ten	  awards	  rendered	  under	  the	  aegis	  of	  the	  ICC	  have	  been	  set	  aside	  by	  a	  national	  court.”22	  	  	   From	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  economic-­‐rationalist	  model,	  arbitration	  forums	  like	  the	  ICA	  must	  evolve	  to	  meet	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  clients	  they	  serve,	  and	  if	  they	  do	  not,	  they	  will	  lose	  business.	  For	  this	  reason,	  state	  intervention	  in	  commercial	  arbitral	  governance	  “is	  neither	  necessary	  nor	  desirable	  as	  this	  market	  pressure	  keeps	  arbitration	  centers	  on	  their	  ‘organizational	  toes.’”23	  However,	  states	  may	  play	  an	  indirect	  role	  by	  ensuring	  that	  state	  corruption	  does	  not	  negatively	  affect	  the	  arbitration	  process	  and	  by	  signing	  onto	  arbitral	  agreements	  such	  as	  the	  NYC.	  Of	  course,	  in	  dispute	  settlement	  forums	  such	  as	  the	  WTO,	  the	  role	  of	  the	  state	  is	  much	  more	  prominent,	  as	  states	  are	  the	  primary	  actors	  in	  this	  forum.	  	  	   Like	  the	  ICA,	  many	  other	  forms	  of	  international	  arbitration	  have	  evolved	  to	  maximize	  efficiency	  in	  resolving	  disputes.	  In	  trade	  disputes	  moderated	  by	  the	  WTO,	  for	  example,	  there	  is	  first	  a	  consultation	  period	  lasting	  approximately	  60	  days	  where	  the	  Dispute	  Settlement	  Body	  works	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  see	  if	  disputing	  parties	  can	  settle	  their	  differences	  without	  resorting	  to	  an	  arbitration	  panel.24	  If	  a	  dispute	  is	  not	  resolved	  after	  this	  period,	  a	  panel	  is	  formed	  to	  hear	  each	  party’s	  side	  of	  the	  case.	  If	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Gerald	  Aksen,	  “Ad	  Hoc	  Versus	  Institutional	  Arbitration,”	  ICC	  International	  Court	  of	  
Arbitration	  Bulletin	  2,	  no.	  1,	  1991,	  12.	  	  22	  Mattli	  and	  Dietz,	  “Mapping	  and	  Assessing	  the	  Rise	  of	  International	  Commercial	  Arbitration	  in	  the	  Globalization	  Era:	  An	  Introduction,”	  8.	  23	  Ibid,	  9.	  	  24	  World	  Trade	  Organization,	  “Understanding	  the	  WTO:	  Settling	  Disputes,”	  WTO.org,	  2016,	  	  https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm.	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the	  parties	  do	  not	  agree	  on	  the	  panel’s	  composition	  within	  20	  days,	  then	  the	  WTO	  Director-­‐General	  can	  appoint	  panel	  members.25	  After	  the	  panel	  issues	  a	  draft	  of	  the	  facts	  of	  the	  case	  to	  the	  two	  parties	  for	  comments,	  it	  then	  sends	  a	  final	  report	  to	  the	  Dispute	  Settlement	  Body	  with	  a	  ruling	  as	  to	  whether	  any	  WTO	  rules	  have	  been	  violated,	  and	  if	  they	  have,	  how	  the	  state	  can	  rectify	  their	  laws	  to	  conform	  to	  WTO	  trade	  standards.26	  If	  there	  is	  no	  request	  for	  an	  appeal	  from	  one	  or	  both	  of	  the	  parties,	  then	  the	  Dispute	  Settlement	  Body	  adopts	  the	  panel’s	  report.	  At	  this	  stage,	  the	  report	  turns	  into	  a	  ruling	  within	  60	  days	  of	  the	  report’s	  adoption,	  unless	  a	  consensus	  by	  the	  Dispute	  Settlement	  Body	  rejects	  it.	  If	  one	  state	  fails	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  ruling,	  the	  other	  party	  may	  ask	  the	  Dispute	  Settlement	  Body	  for	  permission	  to	  impose	  limited	  sanctions	  (sanctions	  which,	  in	  most	  cases,	  only	  focus	  on	  the	  industry	  area	  out	  of	  which	  the	  dispute	  arose).	  From	  start	  to	  finish,	  the	  WTO	  dispute	  settlement	  process	  takes	  approximately	  one	  year	  to	  complete,	  with	  just	  a	  few	  months	  longer	  than	  this	  if	  one	  of	  the	  parties	  requests	  an	  appeal.	  Clearly,	  this	  system	  is	  meant	  to	  resolve	  disputes	  relatively	  quickly	  and	  serves	  to	  clarify	  and	  enforce	  trade	  rules	  among	  WTO	  members.	  Similar	  systems	  apply	  to	  ISDS	  structures	  within	  BITs	  and	  other	  trade	  agreements.	  	  	   In	  summary,	  the	  economic-­‐rationalist	  model	  views	  arbitration	  mechanisms	  as	  effective	  because	  they	  are	  neutral,	  market-­‐based,	  and,	  for	  the	  most	  part,	  self-­‐enforcing	  ways	  of	  ensuring	  compliance	  with	  trade	  laws.	  However,	  while	  the	  economic-­‐rationalist	  model	  does	  provide	  insight	  regarding	  how	  arbitration	  can	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  World	  Trade	  Organization,	  “A	  Summary	  of	  the	  Final	  Act	  of	  the	  Uruguay	  Round,”	  
WTO.org,	  2016,	  https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/ursum_e.htm#Understanding.	  	  26	  World	  Trade	  Organization,	  “Understanding	  the	  WTO:	  Settling	  Disputes.”	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benefit	  societies,	  it	  tends	  to	  ignore	  the	  power	  inequities	  between	  disputing	  parties,	  as	  well	  any	  negative	  externalities	  that	  arbitration	  may	  produce;	  its	  view	  of	  arbitration	  is	  an	  overly	  optimistic	  one.	  Therefore,	  one	  needs	  to	  explore	  other	  models	  to	  gain	  a	  fuller	  perspective	  on	  the	  processes	  of	  international	  arbitration.	  	  
	  
B.	  The	  Cultural-­‐Sociological	  Model	  
	  	   The	  cultural-­‐sociological	  model	  concurs	  with	  the	  economic-­‐rationalist	  model	  regarding	  its	  liberalist	  perspective	  of	  the	  positive	  effects	  of	  arbitration.	  However,	  it	  considers	  the	  economic-­‐rationalist	  model’s	  economic	  explanation	  of	  arbitration	  development	  overly	  simplistic.27	  The	  cultural-­‐sociological	  contends	  that	  understanding	  the	  role	  of	  the	  legal	  culture	  in	  the	  international	  arbitration	  community	  provides	  a	  fuller	  explanation	  as	  to	  why	  arbitration	  has	  evolved	  in	  the	  manner	  that	  it	  has	  and	  can	  provide	  an	  explanation	  as	  to	  why	  arbitration	  processes	  may	  have	  negative	  effects	  on	  environmental	  regulations.	  	   While	   Hale’s	   economic-­‐rationalist	   model	   largely	   focuses	   on	   the	   economic	  benefits	  resulting	   from	  international	  arbitration	  systems,	   it	  does	  not	  examine	  how	  the	   various	   cultural	   norms	   surrounding	   arbitration	   may	   affect	   the	   outcome	   of	  rulings,	  or	  how	  these	  norms	  can	  create	  a	  consistency	  among	  rulings	  that	  legitimizes	  arbitration	  as	  a	  form	  of	  global	  governance	  (and,	  by	  extension,	  the	  trade	  precedents	  that	  arbitration	  panels	  enforce).	  For	  arbitration	  courts	   to	   truly	  be	  a	   form	  of	  global	  governance,	   cultural-­‐sociological	   theorist	   Joshua	  Karton	   argues,	   two	   requirements	  must	  be	  met:	  (1)	  arbitration	  laws	  must	  be	  formulated	  at	  the	  global	  level	  and	  apply	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Mattli	  and	  Dietz,	  “Mapping	  and	  Assessing	  the	  Rise	  of	  International	  Commercial	  Arbitration	  in	  the	  Globalization	  Era:	  An	  Introduction,”	  10.	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without	   discrimination	   to	   the	   nationality	   and	   the	   public	   or	   private	   status	   of	   the	  parties	   involved	   and	   (2)	   arbitral	   decisions	   must	   have	   some	   sort	   of	   “functional	  consistency,”	   which	   means	   that	   similar	   cases	   should	   result	   in	   similar	   rulings.28	  Karton	  makes	  the	  case	  that	   the	  global	   legal	  culture	  of	   the	   international	  arbitration	  community	   enables	   arbitration	   to	  work	   towards	  meeting	   these	   global	   governance	  prerequisites.	  Defining	  culture	  as	  a	  set	  of	  shared	  norms	  affecting	  behavior,	  he	  writes	  that	   international	   arbitrators	   have	   a	   shared	   culture	   stemming	   from	   similar	   elite	  educational	   and	   multicultural	   backgrounds,	   work	   experience	   with	   international	  business	   law	   firms,	   and	   close	   relationships	   with	   the	   business	   and	   academic	  communities.	   29 	  However,	   these	   cultural	   norms	   shaping	   arbitration	   are	   not	  necessarily	  consistent	  with	  the	  norms	  of	  environmentalism.	  	  	  	   In	  Karton’s	  view,	  this	  common	  background	  has	  allowed	  three	  shared	  cultural	  values	   to	   emerge.	   First,	   arbitrators	   have	   a	   normative	   commitment	   to	   promoting	  global	   governance	   for	   its	   own	   sake.	   They	   possess	   an	   internationalist	   perspective,	  which	  Karton	  defines	  as	  “a	  point	  of	  a	  view	  that	  reflects	  a	  dedication	  to	  subordinating	  national	  perspectives	   and	  distinctions	   in	   favor	  of	   transnational	  or	   global	   ideals.”30	  Arbitrators’	   dedication	   to	   ensuring	   that	   arbitral	   bodies	   such	   as	   the	   ICA	   and	   ISDS	  arbitral	   panels	   are	   “delocalized”	   is	   an	   example	   of	   this	   commitment	   to	  internationalism.31	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Joshua	  Karton,	  “International	  Arbitration	  Culture	  and	  Global	  Governance,”	  
International	  Arbitration	  &	  Global	  Governance:	  Contending	  Theories	  and	  Evidence,	  edited	  by	  Walter	  Mattli	  and	  Thomas	  Dietz,	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2014),	  76.	  29	  Ibid,	  79,	  84.	  	  30	  Ibid,	  96.	  	  31	  Ibid,	  96-­‐97.	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   Second,	  arbitrators	  have	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  commitment	  to	  global	  governance	  because	   it	   fulfills	   the	  needs	  of	   the	  business	   community.	  After	   all,	   as	  Karton	  notes,	  “Arbitrators	  are	  private	  contractors…At	  its	  heart,	  arbitration	  is	  a	  service	  industry.”32	  Other	   scholars	  have	  made	   similar	  observations	   about	   international	   arbitration.	  As	  Fabien	   Gélinas	   states,	   “International	   arbitration	   exists	   to	   serve	   the	   needs	   of	  international	   business.”33	  This	   means	   that,	   unlike	   a	   judge	   in	   a	   domestic	   court,	  arbitrators	   tend	   to	   view	   the	   disputing	   parties	   as	   clientele	   “whose	   goodwill,	  understanding,	   and	   respect	   for	   the	   tribunal’s	   authority	   must	   be	   cultivated	   and	  preserved.”34	  In	   interviews	   with	   Karton,	   arbitrators	   expressed	   the	   importance	   of	  tailoring	  the	  arbitration	  process	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  individual	  parties	  involved	  and	  of	   possessing	   advanced	   commercial	   expertise,	   which	   is	   the	   third	   shared	   cultural	  value	   Karton	  mentions.35	  These	   facts,	   which	   stem	   from	   the	   culture	   of	   arbitrators,	  can	   help	   account	   for	   the	   complexity	   and	   variety	   among	   international	   arbitration	  panels	  today,	  and,	  as	  will	  later	  be	  detailed	  later	  on,	  arbitrators’	  tendency	  to	  uphold	  commercial	   trade	  regulations	  while	  neglecting	  considerations	  of	  human	  rights	  and	  the	  environment.	  	  	   Ralf	   Michaels,	   who	   also	   provides	   a	   cultural-­‐sociological	   analysis	   of	  arbitration,	  notes	  that	  international	  arbitration	  still	  depends	  upon	  the	  state	  in	  terms	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  Ibid,	  107.	  	  33	  Fabien	  Gélinas,	  “Arbitration	  and	  the	  Challenge	  of	  Globalization,”	  Journal	  of	  
International	  Arbitration	  17,	  no.	  4,	  2000,	  117.	  	  34	  Michael	  Kerr,	  “Concord	  and	  Conflict	  in	  International	  Arbitration,”	  Arbitration	  
International	  13,	  no.	  2,	  1997,	  121.	  	  35	  Karton,	  “International	  Arbitration	  Culture	  and	  Global	  Governance,”	  108.	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of	  the	  state	  accepting	  and	  carrying	  out	  key	  functions	  of	  the	  arbitration	  process.36	  For	  example,	   state	   courts	   sometimes	  must	   review	   arbitral	   awards	   or	   force	   parties	   to	  concede	   to	  an	  arbitration	  ruling.	  Nevertheless,	  Michaels	  draws	  similar	  conclusions	  to	   Karton	   regarding	   the	   view	   that	   there	   really	   is	   a	   shared	   culture	   among	  international	  arbitrators,	  but	  unlike	  Karton,	  he	  expresses	  uncertainty	  as	  to	  whether	  arbitration	  currently	   constitutes	  a	   form	  of	  global	  governance	  due	   to	   its	   significant	  dependence	  on	  individual	  states.	  	  	   Given	  that	  cultural-­‐sociological	  arbitration	  theorists	  openly	  admit	  that	  private	  interests	  influence	  arbitration	  rulings,	  it	  is	  somewhat	  surprising	  that	  they	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  negative	  externalities	  arbitration	  sometimes	  produces	  due	  to	  an	  inequity	  of	  power	  dynamics	  between	  private	  and	  public	  parties.	  Rather,	  like	  the	  economic-­‐rationalist	  model,	  the	  cultural-­‐sociological	  model	  sees	  arbitration	  as	  globally	  beneficial,	  because	  the	  concern	  of	  arbitrators	  for	  international	  corporations	  allows	  global	  investments	  to	  thrive.	  	  	   While	  the	  cultural-­‐sociological	  does	  provide	  important	  inferences	  regarding	  the	  outcomes	  of	  arbitration	  rulings,	  studying	  the	  culture	  of	  the	  arbitrators	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  paper.	  Understanding	  cultural	  norms	  influencing	  arbitrators	  would	  require	  gaining	  access	  to	  the	  minds	  of	  those	  individuals,	  which	  is	  not	  amenable	  to	  this	  particular	  study.	  In	  short,	  when	  analyzing	  rulings	  from	  arbitral	  panels,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  establish	  in	  each	  particular	  case	  that	  the	  personal	  biases	  of	  arbitrators	  influenced	  the	  rulings.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  is	  a	  culture	  of	  arbitrators	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  Ralf	  Michaels,	  “Roles	  and	  Role	  Perceptions	  of	  International	  Arbitrators,”	  
International	  Arbitration	  &	  Global	  Governance:	  Contending	  Theories	  and	  Evidence,	  edited	  by	  Walter	  Mattli	  and	  Thomas	  Dietz,	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2014),	  72.	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will	  prove	  useful	  when	  investigating	  how	  such	  a	  culture	  emerged	  in	  the	  first	  place	  through	  particular	  trade	  norms	  in	  this	  paper’s	  “Comprehensive	  Power-­‐Based	  Model”	  section.	  	  	   	  	  
C.	  The	  Power-­‐Based	  Model	  
	  	   The	  power-­‐based	  model	  of	  arbitration	  regards	  the	  economic-­‐rationalist	  and	  cultural-­‐sociological	  models	  as	  lacking	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  depth	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  examining	  the	  consequences	  of	  arbitration	  on	  the	  parties	  involved.	  In	  order	  to	  provide	  a	  fuller	  perspective	  of	  all	  the	  externalities	  resulting	  from	  the	  arbitration	  process,	  not	  just	  the	  positive	  ones,	  it	  is	  to	  the	  power-­‐based	  model	  that	  we	  now	  turn.	  	  	  	   Contrary	  to	  the	  previous	  two	  positive-­‐sum	  models,	  the	  power-­‐based	  model	  perceives	  international	  arbitration	  largely	  as	  a	  realist	  zero-­‐sum	  game	  that	  often	  produces	  negative	  externalities	  for	  society.37	  The	  power-­‐based	  model	  recognizes	  that	  in	  disputes	  calling	  for	  arbitration,	  the	  parties	  are	  not	  always	  equal	  in	  their	  power	  to	  affect	  the	  arbitral	  proceedings.	  For	  example,	  wealthier	  states	  often	  have	  much	  more	  money	  and	  legal	  expertise	  at	  their	  expense	  than	  poorer	  states.	  Likewise,	  when	  a	  corporation	  brings	  a	  dispute	  against	  a	  state,	  power	  inequities	  are	  still	  evident;	  using	  data	  from	  the	  Fortune	  500	  and	  International	  Monetary	  Fund,	  Business	  
Insider	  calculated	  that	  if	  Wal-­‐Mart’s	  2010	  revenues	  counted	  as	  GDP,	  for	  example,	  then	  it	  would	  have	  the	  25th	  largest	  economy	  in	  the	  world.38	  Using	  more	  recently	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Mattli	  and	  Dietz,	  “Mapping	  and	  Assessing	  the	  Rise	  of	  International	  Commercial	  Arbitration	  in	  the	  Globalization	  Era:	  An	  Introduction,”	  12.	  38	  Vincent	  Trivett,	  “US	  Mega	  Corporations:	  Where	  They	  Rank	  If	  They	  Were	  Countries,”	  Business	  Insider,	  June	  27,	  2011,	  http://www.businessinsider.com/25-­‐corporations-­‐bigger-­‐tan-­‐countries-­‐2011-­‐6?op=1.	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updated	  figures,	  one	  should	  ponder:	  What	  is	  the	  economic	  and	  legal	  power	  of	  Wal-­‐Mart,	  which	  had	  net	  revenues	  of	  $476.29	  billion	  in	  2014,39	  compared	  to	  a	  developing	  state	  like	  Rwanda,	  which	  had	  a	  GDP	  of	  $7.90	  billion	  in	  the	  same	  year?40	  	  	   Regarding	  the	  role	  of	  arbitrators,	  Michaels,	  a	  cultural-­‐sociological	  theorist,	  writes,	  “The	  arbitrator’s	  private	  role	  in	  dispute	  resolution	  thus	  becomes	  a	  public	  role	  as	  well;	  private	  interests	  dissolve	  into	  public	  interests,	  or	  are	  at	  least	  congruent	  with	  them.”41	  Critical	  theorists	  perceiving	  international	  arbitration	  through	  a	  power-­‐based	  lens	  this	  statement	  problematic.	  Just	  because	  arbitrators	  may	  serve	  a	  public	  role	  by	  overseeing	  an	  international	  dispute	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  private	  and	  public	  sectors	  will	  simply	  “dissolve”	  into	  each	  other	  or	  that	  they	  will	  be	  “congruent.”	  Given	  the	  dominance	  of	  state	  and	  commercial	  interests	  in	  international	  arbitration,	  outcomes	  are	  determined	  by	  the	  exertion	  of	  power,	  rather	  than	  by	  supposedly	  ‘neutral’	  rules	  aiming	  to	  maximize	  economic	  efficiency	  or	  to	  represent	  shared	  legal	  norms.	  Because	  human	  rights	  and	  environmental	  activists	  often	  bring	  less	  power	  to	  bear	  on	  these	  arbitration	  processes,	  their	  interests	  may	  be	  overlooked	  in	  arbitration	  rulings.	  	  	   Furthermore,	  while	  corporations	  can	  bring	  disputes	  against	  states	  under	  many	  different	  trade	  agreements,	  public	  interest	  class	  action	  disputes	  can	  only	  be	  brought	  against	  a	  corporation	  on	  the	  behalf	  of	  a	  state.	  Thus,	  international	  arbitration	  is	  only	  accessible	  to	  corporate	  and	  state	  parties,	  which	  makes	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  MarketWatch,	  “Annual	  Financials	  for	  Wal-­‐Mart	  Stores	  Inc,”	  2016,	  http://www.marketwatch.com/investing/stock/wmt/financials.	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  World	  Bank,	  “GDP	  at	  market	  prices	  (current	  US$)”,	  World	  Bank,	  2016,	  http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD.	  41	  Michaels,	  “Role	  and	  Role	  Perceptions	  of	  Arbitrators,”	  70.	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representation	  of	  local	  populations	  who	  remain	  outside	  of	  state	  interests	  but	  have	  had	  their	  basic	  human	  rights	  violated	  in	  some	  way	  by	  a	  particular	  corporation	  problematic,	  to	  say	  the	  least.	  Along	  these	  lines,	  critical	  theorist	  Horatia	  Muir	  Watt	  notes,	  	   The	  contractual	  nature	  of	  arbitration	  makes	  it	  ill-­‐equipped	  to	  consider	  the	  	   effects	  of	  any	  negative	  externalities	  generated	  by	  investment-­‐linked	  activities	  	   for	  third	  parties.	  Indeed,	  treaties	  generally	  lack	  any	  specific	  procedure	  	   whereby	  communities	  or	  individuals	  whose	  interests	  are	  unaligned	  with	  	   those	  of	  the	  host	  State	  may	  be	  heard.42	  	  	   Additionally,	  Watt	  observes	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  public	  interest	  is	  often	  viewed	  as	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  arbitral	  tribunals,	  given	  that	  the	  trade	  treaties	  creating	  these	  tribunals	  in	  the	  first	  place	  took	  place	  outside	  of	  the	  public	  sphere.43	  The	  Trans-­‐Pacific	  Partnership	  stands	  as	  the	  most	  recent	  example	  of	  this	  phenomenon;	  members	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Congress	  could	  only	  read	  drafts	  of	  the	  agreement	  in	  a	  high-­‐security	  room	  after	  they	  gave	  up	  their	  electronic	  devices,	  and	  they	  were	  not	  allowed	  to	  take	  any	  notes	  on	  they	  made	  on	  the	  agreement	  inside	  of	  the	  room	  with	  them	  when	  leaving.44	  They	  were	  also	  not	  allowed	  to	  talk	  about	  what	  they	  had	  read.	  While	  governments	  attempted	  to	  keep	  early	  drafts	  of	  the	  agreement	  from	  public	  eyes,	  a	  number	  of	  private	  interest	  groups	  did	  have	  a	  seat	  at	  the	  table	  in	  negotiating	  the	  agreement.	  In	  2014,	  private	  industry	  and	  trade	  groups	  make	  up	  480	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  Horatia	  Muir	  Watt,	  “The	  Contested	  Legitimacy	  of	  Investment	  Arbitration	  and	  the	  Human	  Rights	  Ordeal:	  The	  Missing	  Link,”	  International	  Arbitration	  &	  Global	  
Governance:	  Contending	  Theories	  and	  Evidence,	  edited	  by	  Walter	  Mattli	  and	  Thomas	  Dietz,	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2014),	  220.	  43	  Ibid,	  219.	  	  44	  Ailsa	  Chang,	  “A	  Trade	  Deal	  Read	  in	  Secret	  By	  Only	  A	  Few	  (Or	  Maybe	  None)”,	  
NPR.org,	  May	  14,	  2015,	  http://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2015/05/14/406675625/a-­‐trade-­‐deal-­‐read-­‐in-­‐secret-­‐by-­‐only-­‐few-­‐or-­‐maybe-­‐none.	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of	  the	  Obama	  administration’s	  network	  of	  trade	  advisors,	  representing	  85	  percent	  of	  the	  total	  advisors.45	  	  	   While	  liberalist	  models	  tend	  to	  perceive	  arbitrators’	  preference	  for	  internationalism	  and	  the	  de-­‐localization	  of	  national	  legal	  power	  as	  a	  something	  that	  will	  create	  fair,	  international	  legal	  standards	  applying	  equally	  to	  all	  countries,	  the	  realist,	  power-­‐based	  model	  views	  de-­‐localization	  as	  an	  insidious	  attempt	  by	  corporate	  interests	  to	  seize	  greater	  political	  and	  economic	  power.	  As	  Mattli	  and	  Dietz	  note,	  “Critical	  theorists	  see	  de-­‐localization	  as	  part	  of	  a	  much	  wider	  project	  by	  powerful	  corporate	  elites—the	  mercatocracy—to	  push	  market	  fundamentalism,	  including	  privatization,	  liberalization,	  deregulation,	  and	  a	  much-­‐diminished	  welfare	  role	  of	  the	  state.”46	  Investor-­‐state	  arbitration	  created	  by	  BITs,	  which	  often	  involve	  powerful	  investors	  and	  weak	  states,	  are	  a	  primary	  example	  of	  this	  phenomenon.	  This	  kind	  of	  arbitration	  has	  resulted	  in	  a	  number	  of	  negative	  externalities	  for	  the	  populations	  in	  the	  state	  where	  the	  foreign	  investment	  occurs;	  these	  externalities	  include	  land	  expropriation	  that	  damages	  access	  to	  food	  for	  the	  poor,	  the	  destruction	  of	  cultural	  or	  religious	  sites	  and	  practices,	  workforce	  exploitation	  and	  violence,	  and	  of	  course,	  severe	  environmental	  damage.47	  The	  case	  studies	  that	  soon	  follow	  will	  investigate	  whether	  and	  how	  these	  power	  disparities	  play	  out	  in	  the	  environmental	  realm.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  Christopher	  Ingraham	  and	  Howard	  Schneider,	  “Industry	  voices	  dominate	  the	  trade	  advisory	  system,”	  The	  Washington	  Post,	  February	  27,	  2014,	  http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-­‐srv/special/business/trade-­‐advisory-­‐committees/.	  	  	  46	  Mattli	  and	  Dietz,	  “Mapping	  and	  Assessing	  the	  Rise	  of	  International	  Commercial	  Arbitration	  in	  the	  Globalization	  Era:	  An	  Introduction,”	  12.	  47	  Ibid,	  13.	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D.	  The	  Constitutionalization	  Model	  
	  	   Unlike	  the	  other	  models	  of	  arbitration	  discussed	  thus	  far,	  the	  constitutionalization	  model	  accounts	  for	  why	  arbitration	  practices	  change	  over	  time.48	  To	  explain	  some	  changes	  in	  arbitration	  through	  the	  years,	  Mortiz	  Renner	  argues	  that	  arbitration	  panels	  have	  begun	  to	  incorporate	  precedents	  and	  public	  policy	  norms	  into	  their	  rulings.49	  This	  trend	  has	  led	  to	  an	  increasing	  “constitutionalization”	  of	  arbitration	  rulings,	  which	  is	  the	  idea	  these	  ruling	  are	  developing	  over	  time	  into	  a	  consistent,	  global	  body	  of	  law	  with	  its	  own	  set	  of	  enforced	  norms.	  Renner	  notes	  that	  there	  have	  been	  signs	  of	  constitutionalization	  even	  among	  international	  commercial	  arbitral	  panels,	  which	  is	  a	  movement	  away	  from	  the	  past	  ad	  hoc	  nature	  of	  past	  arbitral	  tribunals.	  	  	   Regarding	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  paper,	  one	  could	  make	  the	  case	  that	  international	  trade	  law	  has	  already	  been	  deeply	  constitutionalized	  in	  trade	  treaties,	  and	  by	  extension,	  trade	  arbitration	  rulings.	  Numerous	  trade	  agreements,	  such	  as	  the	  North	  American	  Free	  Trade	  Agreement	  (NAFTA)	  and	  WTO	  trade	  rules,	  ban	  states	  from	  discriminating	  against	  certain	  foreign	  goods	  over	  national	  ones,	  a	  standard	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘national	  treatment’,	  because	  states	  are	  supposed	  to	  give	  particular	  goods	  from	  particular	  states	  the	  same	  treatment	  as	  they	  give	  their	  national	  goods.50	  The	  fact	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  Ibid,	  14.	  	  49	  Moritz	  Renner,	  “Private	  Justice,	  Public	  Policy:	  The	  Constitutionalization	  of	  International	  Commercial	  Arbitration,”	  International	  Arbitration	  &	  Global	  
Governance:	  Contending	  Theories	  and	  Evidence,	  edited	  by	  Walter	  Mattli	  and	  Thomas	  Dietz,	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2014),	  117-­‐139.	  50	  World	  Trade	  Organization,	  “Principles	  of	  the	  trading	  system,”WTO.org,	  https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm.	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that	  the	  idea	  of	  national	  treatment	  serves	  as	  the	  foundation	  for	  many	  trade	  agreements	  should	  therefore	  give	  trade	  arbitral	  panels	  some	  uniformity	  in	  their	  rulings,	  since	  they	  will	  be	  concerned	  with	  enforcing	  this	  standard.	  If	  the	  rules	  governing	  international	  trade	  are	  to	  have	  legitimacy,	  similar	  claims	  filed	  under	  similar	  trade	  rules	  should	  have	  similar	  outcomes.	  It	  would	  be	  problematic	  for	  the	  WTO’s	  legitimacy,	  for	  example,	  if	  it	  had	  allowed	  Canada’s	  solar	  subsidy	  program	  to	  go	  forward	  (the	  subject	  of	  the	  final	  case	  study	  in	  this	  paper)	  but	  not	  India’s.	  	  	  	   In	  some	  ways,	  the	  constitutionalist	  model	  contradicts	  critical	  theorists’	  power-­‐based	  model	  of	  arbitration,	  which	  sees	  arbitration	  as	  separated	  from	  public	  policy	  norms	  in	  most	  scenarios.	  In	  response	  to	  the	  constitutionalization	  model,	  critical	  theorists	  contend	  that	  powerful	  actors	  who	  are	  dissatisfied	  with	  one	  form	  of	  constitutionalized	  arbitration	  could	  simply	  move	  to	  another	  form,	  create	  their	  own	  form,	  or	  simply	  ignore	  arbitration	  rulings	  altogether.	  Likewise,	  Mattli	  and	  Dietz	  write,	  	  “Critical	  theorists	  may	  react	  skeptically	  to	  the	  constitutionalization	  model,	  insisting	  that	  power	  asymmetries	  in	  conjunction	  with	  narrow	  self-­‐interest	  of	  the	  parties	  to	  an	  international	  dispute	  could	  act	  as	  overriding	  structural	  and	  behavioral	  impediments	  to	  the	  erection	  of	  a	  constitutionalized	  arbitral	  architecture.”51	  	  	   To	  address	  this	  concern	  of	  critical	  theorists,	  Renner	  writes,	  “The	  application	  of	  public	  policy	  norms	  directly	  addresses	  the	  issue	  of	  potential	  negative	  externalities	  following	  from	  arbitral	  dispute	  resolution.”52	  For	  example,	  if	  legal	  norms	  concerning	  human	  rights	  or	  the	  environment	  were	  to	  be	  more	  fully	  integrated	  into	  the	  decisions	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  Mattli	  and	  Dietz,	  “Mapping	  and	  Assessing	  the	  Rise	  of	  International	  Commercial	  Arbitration	  in	  the	  Globalization	  Era:	  An	  Introduction,”	  15-­‐16.	  52	  Renner,	  “Private	  Justice,	  Public	  Policy:	  The	  Constitutionalization	  of	  International	  Commercial	  Arbitration,”	  138.	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of	  arbitral	  tribunals,	  then	  perhaps	  this	  would	  make	  arbitration	  a	  more	  equitable	  process.	  In	  fact,	  as	  will	  be	  later	  examined,	  the	  constitutionalization	  model’s	  solution	  for	  solving	  the	  negative	  externalities	  produced	  by	  arbitration	  is	  actually	  very	  much	  in	  line	  with	  solutions	  advocated	  by	  critical	  theorists	  like	  Watt.	  	  	  
IV.	  Case	  Studies	  	   This	  section	  presents	  the	  following	  four	  case	  studies:	  the	  People	  of	  Ecuador	  vs.	  Chevron	  Corporation,	  Methanex	  Corporation	  vs.	  the	  United	  States,	  Japan	  and	  the	  European	  Union	  vs.	  Canada,	  and	  Ethyl	  Corporation	  vs.	  Canada.	  After	  explaining	  the	  facts	  of	  each	  case,	  there	  will	  be	  an	  analysis	  applying	  particular	  aspects	  of	  the	  four	  arbitration	  theories.	  	  	   Each	  case	  has	  been	  selected	  to	  give	  the	  reader	  a	  different	  insight	  into	  the	  potential	  clash	  between	  environmental	  regulations	  and	  international	  trade	  arbitration.	  	  They	  were	  also	  selected	  to	  represent	  a	  variety	  of	  successful	  and	  unsuccessful	  challenges	  to	  environmental	  regulations	  to	  illustrate	  scenarios	  when	  arbitration	  panels	  are	  likely	  to	  rule	  against	  such	  regulations	  and	  when	  they	  are	  not.	  Arbitration	  claims	  filed	  under	  either	  ISDS	  mechanisms	  or	  WTO	  rules	  are	  both	  included	  in	  the	  selection	  of	  cases,	  because	  arbitration	  claims	  have	  come	  into	  conflict	  with	  environmental	  regulations	  in	  each	  of	  these	  realms.	  Also,	  while	  three	  out	  of	  four	  of	  the	  cases	  focus	  specifically	  on	  developed	  states,	  further	  examples	  within	  the	  case	  analysis	  sections	  show	  that	  many	  developing	  states	  also	  face	  similar	  arbitration	  scenarios.	  Finally,	  these	  cases,	  although	  unique	  in	  their	  own	  ways,	  are	  not	  isolated	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incidences;	  rather,	  they	  each	  reflect	  specific	  trends	  in	  how	  international	  arbitration	  may	  conflict	  with	  national	  environmental	  policies.	  	  	  
A.	  The	  People	  of	  Ecuador	  vs.	  Chevron	  Corporation	  	  
	  	   One	  of	  the	  most	  famous,	  longest—and,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  current—environmental	  disputes	  that	  involves	  international	  trade	  arbitration	  is	  Ecuador’s	  ongoing	  case	  against	  Chevron	  Corporation	  regarding	  Texaco	  Inc.’s	  (which	  Chevron	  now	  owns)	  dumping	  of	  more	  than	  18	  billion	  gallons	  of	  toxic	  waste	  into	  streams	  and	  rivers	  in	  the	  Amazon	  used	  for	  drinking	  water	  by	  indigenous	  populations.	  	  	   Before	  delving	  into	  the	  most	  recent	  2016	  arbitration	  rulings	  regarding	  this	  case,	  a	  brief	  historical	  background	  is	  necessary.	  Texaco	  had	  operations	  in	  Ecuador	  from	  1964	  until	  1992.	  In	  1964,	  Ecuador	  granted	  one	  of	  Texaco’s	  subsidiaries,	  TexPet,	  and	  a	  Gulf	  Oil	  subsidiary	  permission	  to	  explore	  for	  and	  produce	  oil	  in	  an	  area	  of	  Ecuador	  called	  the	  Orienté.53	  TexPet	  was	  the	  sole	  operator	  of	  the	  Gulf-­‐TexPet	  joint	  venture,	  which	  was	  called	  the	  Consortium.	  In	  1973,	  Ecuador’s	  state-­‐owned	  oil	  company,	  now	  known	  as	  PetroEcuador,	  bought	  a	  25	  percent	  interest	  in	  the	  Consortium—12.5	  percent	  was	  from	  TexPet,	  and	  the	  other	  12.5	  percent	  was	  from	  Gulf	  Oil.	  Soon	  after	  this	  transaction,	  PetroEcuador	  acquired	  Gulf	  Oil’s	  remaining	  equity,	  thereby	  becoming	  the	  Consortium’s	  majority	  owner.	  Meanwhile,	  TexPet	  held	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  Lewis	  A.	  Kaplan,	  “Chevron	  Corporation	  vs.	  Steven	  Donziger,	  et	  al.,”	  United	  States	  
District	  Court,	  Southern	  District	  of	  New	  York,	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a	  37.5	  percent	  interest	  in	  the	  joint	  agreement.	  TexPet	  continued	  its	  involvement	  with	  the	  Consortium	  until	  June	  1992,	  when	  the	  agreement	  expired.	  	  	   After	  the	  Consortium’s	  expiration,	  Texaco	  and	  the	  Ecuador	  government	  agreed	  to	  a	  Memorandum	  of	  Understanding	  stipulating	  TexPet	  “would	  be	  released	  from	  any	  potential	  claim	  for	  environmental	  harm	  once	  TexPet	  performed	  an	  agreed-­‐upon	  remediation	  in	  the	  area	  in	  which	  it	  had	  operated.”54	  Texaco	  later	  signed	  a	  $40	  million	  remediation	  agreement	  with	  the	  Ecuadorian	  government	  to	  pay	  for	  environmental	  damage	  that	  it	  had	  caused	  in	  Ecuador.	  However,	  this	  remediation	  was	  carried	  out	  poorly;	  cleanup	  efforts	  consisted	  of	  covering	  portions	  of	  the	  polluted	  areas	  with	  tires,	  concrete,	  and	  vegetation.	  Much	  of	  the	  toxic	  waste	  remains	  in	  the	  water	  and	  soil	  to	  this	  day.	  Chevron	  later	  merged	  with	  Texaco	  in	  2001	  to	  form	  Chevron	  Texaco	  Corporation,	  which	  was	  rebranded	  four	  years	  later	  as	  Chevron	  Corporation,	  the	  name	  the	  company	  goes	  by	  today.	  	  	   In	  1993,	  public	  interest	  lawyers	  filed	  a	  class-­‐action	  lawsuit	  on	  behalf	  of	  30,000	  local	  and	  indigenous	  people	  in	  the	  Amazon	  who	  had	  developed	  severe	  health	  problems	  as	  a	  result	  of	  TexPet’s	  toxic	  pollution	  in	  the	  area.55	  The	  lawyers	  chose	  to	  file	  the	  lawsuit	  in	  the	  District	  Court	  of	  New	  York,	  because	  that	  was	  where	  Texaco’s	  company	  headquarters	  were	  located.	  After	  a	  nine-­‐year	  court	  battle,	  the	  U.S.	  courts	  accepted	  Chevron’s	  argument	  that	  the	  United	  States	  did	  not	  have	  the	  proper	  jurisdiction	  to	  settle	  the	  case.	  Thus,	  the	  courts	  rejected	  the	  lawsuit,	  and	  the	  lawyers	  filed	  a	  new	  class-­‐action	  lawsuit	  in	  the	  town	  of	  Lago	  Agrio,	  Ecuador.	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  Public	  Citizen,	  “TPP’s	  Investment	  Rules	  Harm	  the	  Environment,”	  Citizen.org,	  2015,	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   After	  18	  years	  of	  court	  arguments	  in	  both	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Ecuador,	  the	  Lago	  Agrio	  court	  judge	  ruled	  in	  2011	  that	  Chevron	  should	  pay	  $8.6	  billion	  for	  cleanup	  costs	  and	  punitive	  damages.56	  The	  judge	  also	  ruled	  that	  if	  Chevron	  did	  not	  issue	  a	  public	  apology,	  then	  the	  amount	  would	  rise	  to	  $18	  billion,	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  fines	  ever	  imposed	  by	  a	  court	  for	  environmental	  pollution.57	  Because	  Chevron	  refused	  to	  apologize,	  the	  fine	  rose	  to	  $18	  billion.	  Chevron	  then	  filed	  an	  appeal	  to	  the	  ruling	  with	  the	  three-­‐judge	  Provincial	  Court	  of	  Justice	  of	  Sucumbíos,	  which,	  on	  January	  3,	  2012,	  upheld	  the	  lower	  court’s	  ruling.	  On	  January	  20,	  2012,	  Chevron	  filed	  another	  appeal,	  this	  time	  with	  Ecuador’s	  National	  Court	  of	  Justice,	  the	  highest	  court	  in	  the	  country.	  Chevron	  also	  asked	  for	  an	  appeal	  from	  the	  Sucumbíos	  court	  again	  in	  light	  of	  the	  March	  2010	  international	  arbitration	  ruling	  discussed	  below.	  However,	  the	  court	  ruled	  that	  Chevron	  could	  not	  use	  an	  order	  from	  the	  tribunal,	  which	  asked	  for	  Ecuador’s	  government	  to	  suspend	  litigation	  against	  Chevron,	  to	  escape	  the	  enforcement	  of	  the	  Ecuadorian	  courts’	  judgment.	  In	  November	  2013,	  the	  National	  Court	  of	  Justice	  upheld	  a	  penalty	  of	  $9.5	  billion.	  The	  Ecuadorian	  plaintiffs	  proceeded	  to	  file	  lawsuits	  in	  Canada	  and	  Brazil	  in	  2012	  that	  targeted	  Chevron’s	  assets	  in	  those	  countries	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  motivate	  Chevron	  to	  pay	  the	  damages,	  but	  still	  the	  company	  refused	  to	  pay.	  	  	   Instead,	  Chevron	  had	  petitioned	  the	  U.S.	  justice	  system	  for	  relief	  while	  filing	  an	  international	  arbitration	  claim	  in	  December	  2006,	  and	  again	  in	  September	  2009,	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before	  the	  Permanent	  Court	  of	  Arbitration	  at	  The	  Hague	  under	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  U.S.-­‐Ecuador	  Bilateral	  Investment	  Treaty.	  In	  March	  2010,	  the	  arbitral	  panel	  ruled	  that	  Ecuador’s	  government	  had	  violated	  both	  the	  investment	  treaty	  and	  international	  law	  by	  delaying	  rulings	  on	  the	  lawsuit	  that	  was	  then	  pending	  in	  Ecuador’s	  courts.	  The	  Government	  of	  Ecuador	  and	  the	  plaintiffs	  in	  the	  lawsuit	  sought	  an	  injunction	  that	  would	  prohibit	  Chevron	  from	  proceeding	  with	  international	  arbitration	  under	  the	  treaty,	  arguing	  that	  this	  would	  violate	  due	  process	  rights	  in	  Ecuador.	  They	  have	  since	  appealed	  this	  ruling.	  	  	   Then,	  in	  February	  2011,	  the	  international	  arbitration	  panel	  ordered	  Ecuador	  to	  suspend	  the	  enforcement	  of	  any	  penalties	  against	  the	  company	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  such	  damages	  paid	  to	  the	  indigenous	  populations	  would	  interfere	  with	  the	  protection	  of	  private	  property	  rights	  provided	  by	  the	  bilateral	  treaty.	  In	  the	  same	  month,	  a	  U.S.	  court	  made	  a	  similar	  judgment	  in	  Chevron’s	  favor,	  prohibiting	  Ecuador	  from	  enforcing	  any	  penalties	  against	  Chevron	  for	  the	  time	  being.	  As	  explained	  above,	  the	  government	  of	  Ecuador	  ignored	  these	  rulings.	  The	  same	  arbitrational	  panel	  then	  decided	  on	  January	  25,	  2012	  that	  it	  had	  jurisdiction	  under	  the	  investment	  treaty	  to	  decide	  on	  Chevron’s	  liability	  for	  the	  harm	  Ecuador’s	  indigenous	  people	  suffered	  from	  the	  pollution	  of	  their	  land.58	  Additionally,	  a	  global	  anti-­‐suit	  injunction	  in	  favor	  of	  Chevron	  was	  ordered	  by	  U.S.	  Court	  of	  the	  Southern	  District	  of	  New	  York,	  but	  was	  then	  appealed	  a	  year	  later	  by	  the	  U.S.	  Federal	  Court	  of	  Appeals	  for	  the	  Second	  Circuit	  on	  grounds	  that	  such	  an	  injunction	  could	  only	  be	  sought	  defensively.	  The	  Ecuadorian	  plaintiffs	  had	  not	  attempted	  to	  enforce	  their	  judgment	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in	  New	  York	  or	  any	  other	  jurisdiction	  at	  that	  time,	  so	  no	  anti-­‐suit	  injunction	  could	  be	  granted.	  	  	   Throughout	  the	  duration	  of	  these	  numerous	  legal	  cases,	  Chevron	  maintained	  that	  they	  had	  no	  legal	  responsibility	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  environmental	  harm	  Texaco	  caused	  in	  Ecuador,	  because	  the	  government	  of	  Ecuador	  had	  already	  accepted	  reparatory	  payments	  and	  signed	  an	  agreement	  to	  free	  the	  company	  from	  any	  past	  liability	  it	  might	  have	  had.	  Notably,	  the	  arbitration	  tribunal	  contradicted	  this	  argument	  in	  March	  2015,	  reasoning	  that	  a	  settlement	  between	  the	  Ecuadorian	  government	  and	  Texaco	  did	  not	  preclude	  citizens	  of	  the	  country	  from	  suing	  Chevron	  over	  the	  pollution	  one	  of	  its	  subsidiaries	  caused.	  	  	   Finally,	  in	  the	  January	  of	  2016,	  the	  District	  Court	  of	  The	  Hague	  ruled	  in	  favor	  of	  Chevron,	  stating	  the	  arbitration	  panel	  did	  have	  jurisdiction	  to	  rule	  on	  the	  case	  because	  of	  Ecuador’s	  BIT	  with	  the	  United	  States;	  therefore,	  the	  arbitration	  panel’s	  interim	  ruling	  for	  Ecuador	  to	  stop	  attempting	  to	  enforce	  the	  $9.5	  billion	  penalty	  against	  Chevron	  was	  upheld.59	  The	  arbitration	  panel	  has	  not	  yet	  issued	  a	  final	  ruling.	  Chevron	  now	  intends	  to	  make	  Ecuador	  pay	  damages	  for	  the	  violation	  of	  its	  1990s	  settlement	  agreement	  with	  the	  government,	  but	  Ecuador	  has	  said	  that	  it	  will	  fight	  for	  an	  appeal	  to	  the	  Hague	  decision.	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Case	  Analysis	  	  	   If	  the	  situation	  above	  reads	  like	  a	  complicated	  mess	  of	  conflicting	  court	  rulings,	  that	  is	  because	  that	  is	  exactly	  what	  it	  is.	  From	  a	  power-­‐based	  perspective	  of	  arbitration,	  this	  case	  is	  the	  epitome	  of	  the	  shortcomings	  of	  ISDS	  mechanisms.	  	  	  	  	  	   The	  most	  apparent	  power	  disparity	  in	  the	  Ecuador	  vs.	  Chevron	  case	  is	  what	  groups	  can	  be	  represented	  in	  international	  trade	  arbitration.	  Where	  is	  the	  space	  in	  the	  arbitration	  system	  for	  class-­‐action	  lawsuits	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  people?	  In	  reality,	  there	  is	  no	  space,	  because	  on	  the	  level	  of	  international	  arbitration,	  the	  dispute	  must	  always	  be	  between	  state	  governments	  and	  corporations,	  or	  just	  between	  state	  governments	  themselves,	  but	  never	  between	  the	  people	  in	  a	  particular	  state	  and	  a	  corporation	  or	  a	  particular	  government.	  This	  means	  that	  for	  the	  people	  of	  Ecuador,	  there	  is	  literally	  no	  space	  for	  their	  grievances	  to	  be	  legally	  addressed	  on	  an	  international	  level	  without	  the	  government	  of	  Ecuador,	  a	  government	  that	  itself	  played	  a	  role	  in	  creating	  their	  grievances	  by	  partnering	  with	  TexPet	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  Thus,	  under	  ISDS,	  the	  only	  way	  for	  Ecuadorians	  to	  have	  had	  a	  chance	  at	  justice	  in	  the	  first	  place	  was	  to	  have	  a	  party	  that	  played	  a	  role	  in	  the	  poisoning	  and	  destruction	  of	  their	  environment	  represent	  them,	  a	  rather	  perverse	  state	  of	  affairs.	  This	  is	  the	  inequitable	  system	  that	  has	  already	  been	  fully	  constitutionalized	  in	  thousands	  of	  trade	  agreements.	  An	  analogy	  to	  this	  situation	  is	  a	  justice	  system	  where	  the	  only	  way	  a	  rape	  victim	  can	  achieve	  any	  sort	  of	  justice	  would	  be	  by	  having	  one	  of	  her	  rapists	  represent	  her	  in	  a	  claim	  against	  another	  one	  of	  her	  rapists.	  	  	   Furthermore,	  according	  to	  the	  constitutionalist	  model,	  this	  case	  is	  an	  example	  of	  how	  the	  validity	  of	  trade	  agreements	  trumps	  other	  commitments	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countries	  have	  signed	  onto.	  Documents	  regarding	  human	  rights,	  like	  the	  Universal	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights,	  were	  not	  acknowledged	  by	  the	  U.S.-­‐Ecuador	  BIT	  arbitration	  panel	  at	  all.	  The	  key	  difference,	  of	  course,	  is	  that	  the	  agreements	  Ecuador	  had	  with	  Chevron	  and	  the	  United	  States	  are	  legally	  binding,	  whereas	  many	  human	  rights	  commitments,	  such	  as	  the	  Universal	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights	  and	  environmental	  commitments	  like	  the	  recent	  Paris	  Agreement	  on	  climate	  change,	  are	  not.	  Trade	  provisions	  regarding	  national	  treatment	  use	  the	  legally	  binding	  language	  of	  “shall.”	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  trade	  provisions	  regarding	  the	  environment	  almost	  use	  “should”	  language,	  meaning	  that	  in	  an	  ideal	  world,	  states	  should	  try	  to	  meet	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  treaty,	  but	  if	  they	  do	  not,	  then	  they	  will	  not	  be	  legally	  accountable	  in	  any	  way	  for	  their	  failure.	  So,	  it	  is	  quite	  unnecessary	  in	  this	  case	  and	  others	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  cultural-­‐sociological	  model	  of	  arbitration	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  discover	  the	  hidden	  biases	  of	  arbitrators,	  biases	  that	  value	  trade	  norms	  above	  environmental	  ones.	  Such	  a	  bias	  has	  been	  openly	  built	  into	  systems	  of	  international	  arbitration	  itself	  thanks	  to	  the	  legal	  language	  present	  in	  numerous	  international	  treaties.	  	  	   However,	  there	  is	  one	  important	  caveat	  to	  include	  here:	  all	  of	  this	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  human	  rights	  and	  environmental	  norms	  have	  absolutely	  no	  legal	  norms	  of	  enforcement	  in	  the	  international	  system.	  For	  severe	  human	  rights	  violations,	  the	  International	  Criminal	  Court	  prosecutes	  individuals	  who	  commit	  acts	  such	  as	  genocide,	  crimes	  against	  humanity,	  and	  war	  crimes.	  The	  U.S.	  Alien	  Tort	  Claims	  Act	  of	  1789	  allows	  foreigners	  to	  sue	  in	  U.S.	  federal	  courts	  regarding	  violation	  of	  the	  law	  of	  nations	  or	  treaty	  obligations.	  This	  is	  one	  way	  U.S.	  corporations	  may	  be	  held	  accountable	  for	  atrocities	  they	  commit	  abroad,	  although	  it	  does	  not	  always	  work	  out	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in	  practice.	  The	  Ecuadorian	  victims	  of	  Chevron’s	  pollution	  tried	  to	  use	  this	  statute	  in	  their	  original	  1993	  U.S.	  class	  action	  lawsuit	  against	  the	  company,	  but	  the	  U.S.	  court	  ruled	  that	  the	  United	  States	  was	  an	  “inconvenient	  forum”	  and	  that	  the	  case	  was	  better	  settled	  in	  Ecuador.60	  Additionally,	  the	  Alien	  Tort	  Statute	  is	  just	  a	  national	  law	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  not	  an	  international	  one,	  and	  the	  International	  Criminal	  Court	  usually	  only	  prosecutes	  war	  criminals	  from	  developing	  countries,	  not	  wealthy,	  polluting	  corporations.	  Thus,	  it	  is	  fair	  to	  say	  that	  in	  systems	  of	  international	  trade	  arbitration,	  trade	  norms	  have	  much	  more	  legal	  teeth	  than	  human	  rights	  and	  environmental	  norms	  do,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  many	  trade	  issues	  have	  direct	  impacts	  on	  citizens’	  human	  rights	  and	  environment.	  	   Finally,	  within	  the	  power-­‐based	  model,	  the	  dispute	  between	  the	  people	  of	  Ecuador	  and	  Chevron	  perfectly	  illustrates	  how	  the	  international	  arbitration	  system	  often	  benefits	  rich,	  powerful	  corporations	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  vulnerable	  citizens	  with	  limited	  resources.	  One	  of	  these	  benefits	  is	  court	  shopping.	  Basically,	  if	  a	  corporation	  does	  not	  agree	  with	  a	  particular	  ruling,	  then	  it	  can	  petition	  to	  move	  the	  dispute	  into	  a	  more	  friendly,	  international	  forum	  that	  may	  provide	  a	  ruling	  that	  conflicts	  with	  the	  rulings	  of	  whichever	  national	  court	  ruled	  on	  the	  case	  previously.	  Regarding	  this	  situation,	  Watt	  writes,	  “In	  such	  cases,	  the	  last	  word	  belongs	  to	  the	  party	  with	  the	  most	  extra-­‐judicial	  leverage.”61	  Additionally,	  as	  lawyer	  Burt	  Neuborne	  observed	  in	  a	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  Chip	  Pitts,	  “Chevron	  Found	  Guilty	  in	  $	  Billion	  Ecuadorian	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Environmental	  Case,”	  Amnesty	  International,	  February	  14,	  2011,	  http://blog.amnestyusa.org/americas/chevron-­‐found-­‐guilty-­‐in-­‐8-­‐billion-­‐ecuadorian-­‐human-­‐rights-­‐and-­‐environmental-­‐case/.	  	  61	  Watt,	  224	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letter	  written	  on	  May	  22,	  2015	  to	  the	  United	  States	  Court	  of	  Appeals	  for	  the	  Second	  Circuit:	  	   Chevron’s	  strategic	  decision	  in	  2009	  and	  2011	  to	  pursue	  intertwined	  arbitral	  	   and	  equitable	  proceedings	  poses	  many	  of	  the	  problems	  associated	  with	  	   parallel	  judicial	  proceedings.	  It	  is	  inefficiently	  duplicative.	  It	  involves	  blatant	  	   forum	  shopping…	  Most	  importantly,	  it	  poses	  a	  serious	  risk	  of	  inconsistent	  	   answers	  to	  sensitive	  common	  factual	  and	  legal	  questions	  concerning	  	   Ecuadorian	  courts,	  with	  no	  clear	  path	  to	  reconciling	  conflicting	  rulings.62	  	  	   It	  is	  Chevron’s	  court	  shopping	  that	  has	  turned	  this	  class-­‐action	  lawsuit	  into	  a	  legal	  battle	  spanning	  over	  two	  decades,	  one	  that	  still	  is	  not	  fully	  resolved.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  day,	  poor,	  indigenous	  families	  in	  Ecuador	  are	  living	  with—or	  in	  many	  cases,	  have	  died	  because	  of—	  Texaco’s	  decades	  of	  destructive	  environmental	  pollution.	  As	  the	  saying	  goes,	  justice	  delayed	  is	  justice	  denied.	  	  	   The	  economic-­‐rationalists,	  in	  contrast,	  would	  say	  that	  this	  case	  is	  an	  example	  of	  how	  arbitration	  works	  best.	  The	  Ecuadorian	  government	  made	  certain	  agreements	  with	  corporations.	  In	  order	  for	  these	  agreements	  to	  have	  legitimacy,	  corporations	  need	  to	  be	  guaranteed	  that	  these	  agreements	  will	  not	  be	  broken,	  which	  is	  why	  international	  law	  is	  so	  useful	  and	  effective.	  It	  is	  not	  Chevron’s	  fault	  the	  Ecuadorian	  government	  entered	  into	  international	  agreements	  that	  do	  not	  necessarily	  benefit	  Ecuadorian	  citizens.	  As	  Chevron	  said	  regarding	  the	  January	  2016	  decision	  from	  the	  Hague,	  “Today’s	  decision	  reinforces	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  arbitral	  proceedings	  and	  ensures	  that	  Ecuador	  will	  be	  held	  accountable	  for	  violations	  of	  its	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  Burt	  Neuborne,	  “Re:	  Chevron	  Corp.	  v.	  Donziger,	  14-­‐826	  (L),	  Chevron	  Corp.	  v.	  Payaguaje	  and	  Naranjo,	  14-­‐832	  (Con),”	  letter	  to	  the	  United	  States	  Court	  of	  Appeals	  for	  the	  Second	  Circuit,	  May	  22,	  2014,	  5,	  http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-­‐documents/italaw4302.pdf.	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international	  commitments.”63	  Therefore,	  from	  the	  economic-­‐rationalist	  perspective,	  the	  ruling	  in	  this	  case	  strengthens	  the	  rule	  of	  international	  law,	  giving	  legitimacy	  to	  the	  past	  agreements	  governments	  made	  with	  corporations	  and	  with	  each	  other.	  Upholding	  the	  legitimacy	  and	  efficiency	  of	  the	  international	  order	  requires	  that	  these	  international	  courts	  overrule	  national	  ones.	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  both	  Chevron	  and	  the	  economic-­‐rationalist,	  if	  the	  people	  of	  Ecuador	  were	  to	  receive	  any	  kind	  of	  recourse	  for	  the	  harms	  they	  suffered,	  it	  should	  be	  from	  their	  own	  government,	  which	  was	  complacent	  in	  allowing	  such	  harms.	  	  	   However,	  this	  economic-­‐rationalist	  view	  of	  added	  legitimacy	  is	  rather	  questionable.	  In	  2009,	  Ecuador	  withdrew	  from	  the	  Convention	  on	  the	  Settlement	  of	  Investment	  Disputes	  between	  States	  and	  Nationals	  of	  Other	  States.64	  The	  country	  has	  also	  terminated	  10	  BITs	  since	  2008.	  Currently,	  eight	  additional	  BITs,	  including	  the	  investment	  treaty	  with	  the	  United	  States,	  are	  under	  consideration	  of	  termination	  by	  Ecuador.	  Additionally,	  on	  May	  6,	  2013,	  Ecuadorian	  President	  Rafael	  Correa	  created	  the	  Citizen’s	  Audit	  Commission.	  He	  tasked	  it	  with	  auditing	  BITs	  that	  include	  ISDS	  provisions	  and	  examining	  potential	  deficiencies	  in	  past	  investment	  arbitrations	  in	  which	  Ecuador	  was	  involved.	  President	  Correa’s	  decree	  of	  the	  Commission’s	  creation	  “purports	  to	  be	  premised	  on	  an	  urgent	  need	  to	  review	  BITs	  and	  the	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  Dutch	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dissatisfaction	  with	  the	  awards	  against	  Ecuador	  in	  investment	  arbitrations.”65	  Other	  countries	  may	  follow	  suit.	  Such	  occurrences	  demonstrate	  that	  arbitration	  rulings	  perceived	  as	  inequitable	  by	  host	  states	  may	  actually	  delegitimize	  the	  power	  of	  international	  trade	  arbitration,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  power	  of	  past	  trade	  agreements.	  	  	   As	  for	  the	  contention	  that	  the	  government	  of	  Ecuador	  should	  pay	  its	  citizens	  reparations	  for	  the	  damages,	  this	  may	  well	  be	  true,	  but	  it	  does	  that	  mean	  that	  Ecuador	  alone	  should	  pay	  for	  the	  damages,	  especially	  since	  TexPet	  conducted	  the	  Consortium’s	  damaging	  operations.	  The	  larger	  problem	  here	  is	  that	  the	  current	  international	  system	  of	  law	  and	  order	  has,	  so	  far,	  allowed	  a	  major	  culprit	  of	  environmental	  pollution	  to	  get	  off	  relatively	  unscathed	  with	  little	  accountability	  to	  the	  people	  it	  harmed.	  	  	   In	  short,	  when	  theorists	  take	  the	  economic-­‐rationalist	  model	  at	  face	  value,	  they	  may	  miss	  core	  failings	  lodged	  at	  the	  very	  heart	  of	  international	  arbitration	  systems.	  Economic-­‐rationalists	  must	  start	  asking	  themselves:	  whom	  do	  systems	  of	  international	  trade	  arbitration	  serve,	  and	  whom	  do	  they	  not?	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B.	  Methanex	  Corporation	  vs.	  United	  States	  of	  America	  	   As	  this	  case	  study	  will	  demonstrate,	  ISDS	  cases	  are	  not	  always	  as	  complex	  and	  drawn	  out	  as	  the	  Ecuador	  vs.	  Chevron	  case,	  and	  sometimes,	  arbitration	  panels	  do	  rule	  in	  favor	  of	  environmental	  regulations,	  so	  long	  as	  those	  regulations	  align	  with	  established	  international	  trade	  law.	  In	  Methanex	  Corporation	  vs.	  United	  States	  of	  
America,	  Methanex	  Corporation,	  a	  Canadian	  company	  that	  was	  and	  remains	  the	  world’s	  largest	  distributor	  of	  methanol,	  sent	  in	  an	  arbitration	  claim	  under	  the	  United	  Nations	  Commission	  on	  International	  Trade	  Law	  “for	  alleged	  injuries	  resulting	  from	  a	  California	  ban	  on	  the	  use	  or	  sale	  in	  California	  of	  the	  gasoline	  additive	  MTBE	  [methyl	  tert-­‐butyl	  ether].”66	  One	  of	  the	  primary	  ingredients	  used	  to	  manufacture	  MTBE	  is,	  as	  the	  name	  of	  the	  substance	  indicates,	  methanol.	  	  	   MTBE	  is	  a	  fuel	  oxygenate.67	  Fuel	  oxygenates	  are	  added	  to	  gasoline	  because	  they	  allow	  it	  to	  burn	  better,	  thereby	  decreasing	  harmful	  fuel	  emissions.	  MTBE	  was	  first	  used	  in	  gasoline	  in	  the	  United	  States	  at	  low	  levels	  in	  1979	  to	  replace	  lead	  as	  an	  octane	  enhancer.	  MTBE	  concentrations	  in	  some	  gasoline	  increased	  after	  the	  U.S.	  Congress	  passed	  the	  1990	  Clean	  Air	  Act	  Amendments,	  which	  required	  the	  use	  of	  oxygenated	  gasoline	  in	  areas	  that	  have	  unhealthy	  levels	  of	  air	  pollution.	  However,	  despite	  its	  ability	  to	  reduce	  air	  pollution	  from	  the	  burning	  of	  gasoline,	  MTBE	  is	  more	  soluble	  in	  water	  than	  other	  chemicals	  used	  in	  gasoline,	  meaning	  it	  can	  travel	  faster	  and	  farther	  through	  groundwater.	  Even	  small	  amounts	  of	  MTBE	  can	  make	  water	  toxic	  for	  human	  consumption.	  It	  is	  also	  not	  easily	  biodegradable,	  which	  makes	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contamination	  cleanups	  more	  difficult.	  In	  light	  of	  these	  negative	  impacts	  on	  human	  health	  and	  the	  environment,	  California	  governor	  Gray	  Davis	  issued	  an	  executive	  order	  banning	  MTBE	  in	  the	  state	  in	  1999.	  	  	   In	  their	  arbitral	  claim,	  Methanex	  argued	  that	  California’s	  executive	  order	  and	  other	  U.S.	  state	  MTBE	  bans	  “expropriated	  parts	  of	  its	  investments	  in	  the	  United	  States,”	  thereby	  violating	  Article	  1110	  of	  NAFTA,	  a	  treaty	  that	  includes	  the	  United	  States,	  Canada,	  and	  Mexico.68	  The	  corporation	  also	  contended	  that	  these	  bans	  on	  MTBE	  violated	  fair	  and	  equitable	  treatment	  in	  international	  trade	  under	  Article	  1105,	  and	  that	  the	  United	  States	  denied	  it	  the	  fair	  national	  treatment	  that	  Article	  1102	  requires.	  In	  light	  of	  these	  alleged	  violations,	  Methanex	  sought	  $970	  million	  in	  damages	  from	  the	  United	  States.	  	  	   The	  first	  arbitration	  hearing	  was	  held	  in	  July	  2001,	  which	  determined	  that	  the	  arbitral	  tribunal	  had	  jurisdiction	  over	  the	  case.	  After	  additional	  hearings	  assessing	  each	  side’s	  claims	  and	  interpreting	  the	  submitted	  evidence,	  the	  tribunal	  released	  its	  final	  judgment	  on	  August	  9,	  2005,	  dismissing	  all	  of	  Methanex’s	  claims.	  Additionally,	  the	  tribunal	  ordered	  Methanex	  to	  cover	  the	  costs	  of	  the	  United	  States’	  legal	  fees	  and	  arbitral	  expenses	  to	  the	  tune	  of	  approximately	  $4	  million.	  	  	   Regarding	  fair	  national	  treatment	  of	  products	  established	  by	  Article	  1102	  of	  NAFTA,	  the	  arbitration	  panel	  expressed	  in	  its	  official	  ruling,	  	  	   …the	  Tribunal	  decides	  that	  Methanex’s	  claim	  under	  Article	  1102	  fails,	  for,	  	   without	  regard	  to	  the	  question	  of	  causation,	  the	  California	  MTBE	  ban	  did	  not	  	   differentiate	  between	  foreign	  and	  domestic	  MTBE	  producers;	  nor,	  if	  it	  is	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   relevant,	  did	  it	  differentiate	  between	  foreign	  and	  domestic	  methanol	  	   producers.69	  	   	  Similarly,	  the	  panel	  dismissed	  Methanex’s	  claim	  under	  Article	  1105,	  because	  the	  U.S.	  regulations	  banned	  MTBE	  use	  from	  national	  producers	  as	  well	  as	  international	  ones.	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  is	  as	  follows:	  international	  trade	  law	  tends	  to	  focus	  on	  specific	  products	  and	  services.	  Under	  treaties	  like	  NAFTA,	  states	  are	  not	  prohibited	  from	  outlawing	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  good	  or	  service;	  rather,	  the	  main	  focus	  is	  on	  ensuring	  that	  a	  state	  does	  not	  engage	  in	  discriminatory	  practices	  that	  favor	  a	  nationally	  produced	  version	  of	  a	  particular	  good	  over	  a	  foreign-­‐produced	  version	  of	  that	  same	  good.	  Finally,	  because	  the	  United	  States	  did	  not	  seize	  or	  transfer	  any	  Methanex	  property,	  no	  expropriation	  as	  defined	  by	  Article	  1110	  occurred.	  Thus,	  Methanex	  lost	  the	  case,	  and	  U.S.	  state	  bans	  on	  MTBE	  remain	  to	  this	  day.	  	  	  
	  Case	  Analysis	  	   On	  the	  surface	  level,	  this	  is	  an	  example	  of	  how	  environmental	  regulations	  can	  work	  within	  the	  context	  of	  international	  trade	  laws.	  As	  the	  arbitration	  panel	  observed,	  the	  California	  ban	  on	  MTBE	  is	  not	  an	  example	  of	  trade	  discrimination	  because,	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  MTBE	  was	  from	  a	  national	  or	  foreign	  producer,	  it	  would	  still	  be	  banned	  in	  California.	  	  	   The	  economic-­‐rationalist	  model	  acknowledges	  that	  states	  have	  the	  power	  to	  regulate	  the	  products	  that	  cross	  their	  borders,	  so	  long	  as	  those	  regulations	  are	  in	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line	  with	  pre-­‐existing	  commitments	  the	  state	  has	  made	  with	  other	  parties.	  This	  model	  emphasizes	  that	  a	  primary	  benefit	  of	  arbitration	  is	  that	  it	  keeps	  the	  disputing	  parties	  on	  the	  same	  terms,	  holding	  them	  to	  any	  agreements	  that	  they	  made	  with	  each	  other.	  While	  those	  concerned	  purely	  with	  the	  economic	  benefits	  corporations	  gain	  from	  trade	  may	  view	  this	  case	  negatively,	  supporters	  of	  the	  economic-­‐rationalist	  model	  would	  stress	  that	  the	  ban	  on	  MTBE	  violated	  no	  legal	  contracts	  between	  the	  parties.	  Methanex	  argued	  that	  banning	  MTBE	  was	  discriminatory	  because	  the	  United	  States	  favored	  the	  national	  production	  of	  ethanol,	  a	  fuel	  oxygenate	  substitute,	  in	  place	  of	  the	  foreign	  production	  of	  methanol.	  But	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  international	  trade	  law,	  MTBE	  and	  ethanol	  are	  fundamentally	  different	  products,	  so	  banning	  one	  product	  but	  not	  the	  other	  does	  not	  constitute	  discrimination.	  Therefore,	  if	  Methanex	  thought	  it	  was	  discriminatory	  for	  California	  to	  ban	  MTBE,	  it	  was	  only	  because	  Methanex	  did	  not	  fully	  understand	  (or	  wanted	  to	  twist	  or	  ignore)	  previous	  trade	  commitments	  forged	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Canada.	  International	  arbitration	  served	  to	  clarify	  these	  commitments.	  In	  the	  long	  run,	  this	  clarification	  makes	  the	  international	  trade	  system	  stronger	  and	  more	  efficient,	  for	  it	  preserves	  the	  sovereign	  power	  of	  nations	  to	  regulate	  which	  products	  pass	  through	  their	  borders.	  If	  nations	  could	  no	  longer	  do	  this,	  then	  some	  nations	  might	  decide	  to	  withdraw	  their	  signatures	  from	  previous	  trade	  commitments.	  This	  scenario	  would	  make	  forming	  trade	  relations	  more	  difficult,	  creating	  unnecessary	  barriers	  to	  international	  trade	  flows.	  In	  short,	  this	  arbitration	  ruling	  protected	  the	  efficiency	  and	  reliability	  of	  international	  trade	  agreements.	  	  
The	  Corporatization	  of	  Justice	   Novak	  43	  
	   But	  the	  power-­‐based	  model	  contends	  that	  there	  is	  more	  to	  this	  case	  than	  just	  a	  standard	  interpretation	  of	  international	  trade	  law.	  This	  model	  reminds	  us	  to	  look	  at	  who	  the	  disputing	  parties	  are	  and	  to	  take	  note	  of	  any	  potential	  power	  disparities.	  The	  amount	  of	  power	  a	  particular	  entity	  has	  can	  be	  defined	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  easily	  that	  entity	  can	  make	  other	  parties	  conform	  to	  its	  will	  for	  a	  desired	  outcome.	  In	  international	  arbitration	  courts,	  the	  political	  and	  economic	  resources	  of	  the	  parties	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  shaping	  each	  one’s	  level	  of	  power.	  	  	   Political	  power	  is	  important	  because	  the	  amount	  of	  perceived	  influence	  a	  country	  or	  corporation	  has	  may	  affect	  how	  willing	  the	  arbitration	  panel	  is	  to	  issue	  a	  ruling	  against	  a	  particularly	  powerful	  party.	  Based	  on	  insights	  from	  the	  cultural-­‐sociological	  model	  regarding	  the	  fact	  that	  arbitration	  judges	  have	  their	  own	  biases,	  a	  judge	  might	  think	  twice	  about	  issuing	  a	  ruling	  against	  one	  of	  the	  P-­‐5	  countries	  in	  comparison	  to	  a	  relatively	  obscure	  state,	  like	  the	  island	  nation	  of	  Kiribati.	  While	  this	  would	  be	  difficult	  to	  conclusively	  establish	  without	  interviewing	  numerous	  arbitrators,	  Schultz	  and	  Dupont’s	  finding	  that	  developed	  countries	  since	  1998	  were	  1.7	  times	  more	  likely	  than	  developing	  countries	  to	  win	  arbitration	  cases	  add	  some	  inconclusive	  support	  to	  this	  theory.	  	  	   Likewise,	  economic	  power	  matters	  because	  arbitration	  disputes	  can	  cost	  the	  disputing	  parties	  hundreds	  of	  millions	  of	  dollars,	  an	  amount	  of	  money	  some	  nations	  and	  companies	  aren’t	  willing	  or	  able	  to	  easily	  afford.	  This	  factor	  can	  affect	  the	  quality	  of	  lawyers	  a	  party	  has	  access	  to,	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  party	  chooses	  to	  pursue	  an	  appeal	  to	  an	  unfavorable	  ruling,	  or	  whether	  a	  party	  even	  files	  a	  claim	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  It	  can	  also	  affect	  how	  easily	  a	  particular	  party	  is	  willing	  to	  settle	  a	  claim	  rather	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than	  spending	  funds	  on	  expensive	  lawyers	  and	  waiting	  for	  a	  ruling	  from	  an	  arbitral	  panel.	  	  	   In	  this	  particular	  case,	  although	  Methanex	  is	  a	  successful	  corporation,	  its	  economic	  and	  political	  power	  is	  miniscule	  compared	  to	  that	  of	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America,	  the	  wealthiest	  (and,	  arguably,	  the	  most	  powerful)	  nation	  in	  history.	  If	  the	  state	  in	  this	  case	  had	  been	  less	  economically	  and	  politically	  powerful,	  or	  if	  the	  corporation	  had	  been	  more	  so,	  then	  the	  outcome	  might	  have	  changed.	  At	  the	  very	  least,	  Methanex	  might	  have	  sought	  an	  appeal,	  or	  fought	  to	  transfer	  the	  case	  to	  a	  different	  court	  system,	  as	  Chevron	  did.	  Perhaps	  the	  MTBE	  bans	  would	  indeed	  be	  perceived	  as	  discriminatory,	  setting	  a	  new	  definition	  for	  what	  constitutes	  trade	  discrimination.	  Although	  the	  latter	  situation	  is	  not	  at	  all	  likely	  because	  of	  pre-­‐existing	  trade	  law	  precedent,	  it	  might	  be	  possible,	  given	  the	  right	  arbitration	  judges	  and	  ad	  hoc	  setting.	  	  	  	   On	  a	  final	  note,	  this	  case	  was	  a	  success	  for	  environmental	  regulations	  only	  
because	  those	  regulations	  did	  not	  violate	  pre-­‐existing	  international	  trade	  agreements	  based	  on	  a	  technicality	  of	  what	  nondiscrimination	  means.	  The	  norm	  of	  nondiscrimination	  is	  strongly	  legalized	  in	  trade,	  as	  the	  constitutionalization	  model	  notes.	  This	  certainly	  increases	  the	  strength	  and	  validity	  of	  international	  arbitration	  rulings,	  for	  it	  demonstrates	  consistency	  in	  the	  definition	  of	  nondiscrimination	  and	  helps	  to	  constitutionalize	  such	  an	  interpretation.	  Thus,	  the	  ISDS	  mechanism	  does	  allow	  for	  certain	  narrow	  victories	  for	  environmental	  regulations	  falling	  within	  the	  definition	  of	  nondiscrimination.	  The	  problem	  is,	  we	  need	  much	  more	  room	  for	  environmental	  regulations	  and	  programs	  than	  this	  miniscule	  legal	  space	  allows.	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   What	  happens	  when	  elements	  of	  trade	  law	  are	  fundamentally	  opposed	  to	  environmental	  policies,	  such	  as	  recent	  initiatives	  needed	  to	  combat	  global	  climate	  change?	  As	  the	  next	  case	  will	  demonstrate,	  there	  are	  times	  when	  the	  technicalities	  of	  international	  trade	  law	  are	  used	  to	  overturn	  rather	  than	  uphold	  environmental	  laws.	  	  	  
C.	  Japan	  and	  the	  European	  Union	  vs.	  Canada	  	  
	   Increasingly,	  governments	  are	  challenging	  renewable	  energy	  programs	  that	  rely	  on	  subsidies	  in	  other	  countries	  through	  the	  use	  of	  international	  trade	  agreements.	  What	  follows	  is	  just	  one	  example	  of	  an	  increasingly	  common	  trend	  in	  how	  arbitration	  can	  be	  used	  to	  shut	  down	  particular	  environmental	  programs.	  Unlike	  the	  other	  cases	  examined	  so	  far,	  this	  case	  is	  an	  example	  of	  arbitration	  between	  states	  through	  the	  WTO,	  not	  arbitration	  via	  an	  ISDS	  mechanism.	  	  	   The	  story	  of	  this	  case	  starts	  with	  Silfab,	  an	  Italian	  corporation	  that	  manufactures	  solar	  panels.	  In	  2010,	  Silfab	  decided	  to	  open	  up	  its	  first	  North	  American	  solar	  manufacturing	  plant	  in	  Ontario,	  the	  province	  with	  the	  highest	  population	  in	  Canada.70	  Despite	  Ontario’s	  relative	  lack	  of	  sunlight	  compared	  to	  other	  places	  on	  the	  North	  American	  continent,	  this	  location	  seemed	  like	  a	  smart	  move	  to	  the	  corporation’s	  executives	  because	  of	  a	  new	  environmental	  action	  plan	  Ontario	  passed	  in	  2009.	  This	  plan,	  called	  the	  Green	  Energy	  and	  Green	  Economy	  Act,	  vowed	  to	  phase	  out	  the	  province’s	  reliance	  on	  coal	  by	  2014.	  To	  help	  accomplish	  this	  ambitious	  goal,	  the	  legislation	  included	  a	  feed-­‐in	  tariff	  program	  allowing	  renewable	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  Naomi	  Klein,	  This	  Changes	  Everything:	  Capitalism	  vs.	  The	  Climate,	  (New	  York,	  NY:	  Simon	  &	  Schuster,	  2014),	  66-­‐67.	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energy	  companies	  to	  sell	  power	  back	  to	  Ontario’s	  electricity	  grid	  at	  guaranteed	  premium	  prices.	  However,	  in	  order	  to	  qualify	  for	  the	  program,	  40	  to	  60	  percent	  of	  a	  renewable	  energy	  company’s	  workforces	  and	  material	  had	  to	  be	  local	  to	  Ontario.	  This	  provision	  meant	  that	  solar	  manufacturers	  like	  Silfab	  would	  have	  access	  to	  a	  stable	  market	  and	  would	  not	  be	  forced	  to	  compete	  against	  cheaper	  solar	  panels	  from	  Chinese	  manufacturers,	  who	  were	  and	  are	  bolstered	  by	  solar	  subsidies	  themselves.	  Note	  that	  under	  WTO	  law,	  Ontario’s	  preferential	  treatment	  of	  their	  local	  solar	  industry	  counts	  as	  a	  subsidy,	  because	  it	  is,	  in	  effect,	  giving	  more	  money	  to	  local	  solar	  producers	  than	  to	  foreign	  solar	  producers	  for	  the	  same	  product,	  thereby	  creating	  a	  market	  distortion.	  	  	   At	  first,	  this	  legislation	  was	  quite	  successful	  in	  expanding	  clean	  energy	  production.	  Journalist	  Naomi	  Klein	  writes,	  “By	  2012,	  Ontario	  was	  the	  largest	  solar	  producer	  in	  Canada	  and	  by	  2013,	  it	  had	  only	  one	  working	  coal-­‐fired	  power	  plant	  left.	  And	  by	  2014,	  more	  than	  31,000	  jobs	  had	  been	  created.”71	  Additionally,	  many	  of	  the	  workers	  hired	  by	  Silfab	  came	  from	  Canada’s	  nearly	  defunct	  auto	  sector,	  which	  had	  been	  badly	  damaged	  due	  to	  the	  financial	  troubles	  of	  General	  Motors	  and	  Chrysler.	  	  	   These	  solar	  panel	  subsidies	  quickly	  ended	  when	  Japan	  and	  the	  European	  Union	  brought	  a	  WTO	  dispute	  against	  Ontario.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  certain	  types	  of	  subsidies	  under	  WTO	  rules	  are	  permissible.	  For	  example,	  the	  WTO	  permits	  agricultural	  subsidy	  programs	  and	  the	  granting	  of	  limited	  subsidies	  to	  companies	  adapting	  to	  new	  environmental	  laws.72	  However,	  the	  1995	  Agreement	  on	  Subsidies	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	  Ibid,	  67.	  	  72	  World	  Trade	  Organization,	  “The	  environment:	  a	  specific	  concern,”	  WTO.org,	  2016,	  https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/bey2_e.htm.	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and	  Countervailing	  Measures	  (SCM)	  bans	  the	  use	  of	  many	  kinds	  of	  subsidies,	  including	  subsidies	  like	  Ontario’s	  feed-­‐in	  tariff	  program.	  As	  such,	  the	  WTO	  Dispute	  Settlement	  Body	  ruled	  in	  2012	  that	  Ontario’s	  buy-­‐local	  provisions	  were	  illegally	  protectionist.	  The	  province	  complied	  in	  ending	  the	  program.	  According	  to	  Silfab	  businessman	  Paolo	  Maccario,	  this	  ruling	  led	  foreign	  investors	  to	  rescind	  their	  support	  for	  the	  factory’s	  expansion.73	  	  	  	   This	  is	  not	  the	  first	  time	  the	  subsidization	  of	  renewable	  energy	  companies	  has	  come	  up	  in	  international	  disputes.	  In	  2010,	  for	  example,	  the	  United	  States	  considered	  challenging	  a	  Chinese	  wind	  power	  subsidy	  program	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  it	  violated	  WTO	  standards	  of	  fair	  and	  equal	  treatment	  of	  particular	  goods	  between	  nations.74	  In	  response,	  China	  filed	  a	  complaint	  in	  2012	  against	  renewable	  energy	  programs	  in	  the	  EU	  and	  threatened	  to	  bring	  a	  dispute	  challenging	  renewable	  energy	  subsidy	  programs	  in	  five	  U.S.	  states,	  charging	  the	  U.S.	  government	  with	  protectionism.	  Later	  on,	  in	  2014,	  the	  WTO	  ruled	  against	  import	  tariffs	  the	  United	  States	  had	  placed	  on	  Chinese	  solar	  panels,	  tariffs	  which	  the	  United	  States	  originally	  enacted	  in	  reaction	  to	  China’s	  subsidization	  of	  their	  own	  solar	  industry.75	  	  Even	  more	  recently,	  the	  WTO	  ruled	  against	  India’s	  solar	  subsidization	  program,	  the	  National	  Solar	  Mission,	  in	  February	  2016.76	  In	  the	  five	  years	  since	  India	  first	  announced	  the	  program,	  the	  state	  had	  expanded	  its	  solar	  capacity	  from	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almost	  nothing	  to	  5,000	  megawatts,	  thanks	  to	  the	  long-­‐term	  energy	  contracts	  and	  government	  subsidies	  the	  program	  provided	  to	  the	  solar	  industry.	  But	  then	  the	  United	  States	  filed	  a	  WTO	  dispute	  in	  2014	  against	  India’s	  program,	  arguing	  that	  buy-­‐local	  provisions	  unfairly	  disadvantaged	  U.S.	  solar	  companies	  exporting	  products	  to	  India.	  As	  was	  the	  case	  with	  Ontario,	  India’s	  subsidization	  of	  renewable	  energy	  is	  no	  longer	  allowed	  to	  continue	  under	  international	  law.	  India’s	  energy	  minister,	  Piyush	  Goyal,	  has	  since	  announced	  that	  he	  plans	  to	  file	  16	  WTO	  cases	  against	  the	  United	  States.77	  Given	  that	  there	  are	  many	  other	  countries	  that	  subsidize	  renewable	  energy,	  similar	  trade	  disputes	  may	  occur	  in	  the	  future.	  	  	  
Case	  Analysis	  	   As	  with	  the	  previous	  case	  between	  Methanex	  Corporation	  and	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  economic-­‐rationalist	  would	  consider	  these	  solar	  subsidy	  trade	  disputes	  good	  examples	  of	  how	  arbitration	  courts	  help	  facilitate	  free	  trade	  on	  the	  terms	  to	  which	  nations	  have	  mutually	  agreed.	  Legally,	  the	  WTO	  arbitration	  panel	  had	  to	  rule	  against	  solar	  subsidies,	  because	  these	  subsidies	  do	  violate	  the	  fair	  and	  equal	  treatment	  of	  goods	  between	  nations.	  Ontario	  was	  indeed	  favoring	  its	  own	  solar	  industry	  over	  that	  of	  Japan’s.	  Certain	  sectors,	  such	  as	  agricultural	  and	  oil	  companies,	  are	  exempted	  in	  some	  way	  from	  nondiscrimination	  WTO	  trade	  rules,	  but	  the	  solar	  industry	  is	  not	  one	  of	  these	  sectors.	  From	  an	  economic-­‐rationalist	  perspective,	  because	  these	  trade	  arrangements	  are	  what	  nations	  have	  previously	  agreed	  to,	  they	  must	  keep	  these	  agreements,	  form	  new	  ones,	  or	  withdraw	  from	  the	  WTO.	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Subsidizing	  a	  good	  banned	  from	  subsidization	  under	  fair	  and	  equal	  treatment	  standards	  while	  still	  remaining	  a	  WTO	  member	  cheapens	  the	  meaning	  of	  international	  trade	  agreements	  and	  puts	  the	  whole	  system	  in	  jeopardy.	  	  	   For	  the	  power-­‐based	  analyst,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  this	  case	  demonstrates	  how	  1940s	  trade	  norms	  fail	  to	  account	  for	  the	  modern	  environmental	  challenges	  nations	  face	  today.	  Of	  course,	  the	  fact	  that	  trade	  law	  has	  become	  normalized	  in	  this	  way	  also	  validates	  the	  constitutionalization	  model,	  but	  the	  power-­‐based	  model	  provides	  a	  fuller	  analysis	  here,	  because	  it	  delves	  into	  the	  effects	  of	  such	  constitutionalization	  for	  different	  actors	  in	  the	  international	  order.	  The	  power-­‐based	  model	  views	  this	  case	  as	  an	  example	  of	  how	  trade	  laws	  are	  built	  to	  meet	  the	  needs	  of	  nations	  and	  corporations,	  not	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  citizens	  who	  are	  already	  suffering	  the	  impacts	  of	  climate	  change.	  As	  Klein	  pointedly	  observes,	  “From	  a	  climate	  perspective,	  the	  WTO	  ruling	  was	  an	  outrage:	  If	  we	  want	  to	  keep	  warming	  below	  catastrophic	  levels,	  wealthy	  economies	  like	  Canada	  must	  make	  getting	  off	  fossil	  fuels	  their	  top	  priority.	  How	  absurd,	  then,	  for	  the	  WTO	  to	  interfere	  with	  that	  success	  —	  to	  let	  trade	  trump	  the	  planet	  itself.”78	  	  	   The	  vast	  majority	  of	  scientists	  agree	  that	  climate	  change	  is	  already	  happening,	  with	  2014,	  and	  then	  2015,	  as	  the	  hottest	  years	  on	  record.	  The	  Paris	  Agreement	  of	  2015	  stands	  as	  an	  international	  recognition	  of	  the	  reality	  of	  these	  changes	  in	  our	  climate	  and	  the	  need	  to	  enact	  policies	  to	  mitigate	  how	  much	  temperatures	  will	  rise.	  One	  of	  the	  most	  important	  actions	  governments	  can	  take	  to	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lower	  carbon	  emissions	  is	  to	  decrease	  their	  dependence	  on	  fossil	  fuels	  by	  investing	  in	  renewable	  energies.	  Unfortunately,	  trade	  rules	  prioritizing	  free	  market	  incentives	  over	  the	  planet	  are	  now	  preventing	  some	  nations	  from	  doing	  this.	  	  	   Although	  the	  price	  of	  U.S.	  solar	  power	  has	  dropped	  70	  percent	  since	  2009,79	  the	  renewable	  energy	  industry	  still	  needs	  heavy	  subsidization	  by	  the	  government	  if	  it	  is	  to	  expand	  and	  remain	  competitive.	  There	  are	  two	  reasons	  for	  this.	  The	  first	  reason	  is	  that	  governments	  across	  the	  globe	  have	  given	  generous	  subsidies	  to	  fossil	  fuel	  companies	  for	  decades.	  Over	  the	  past	  century,	  the	  U.S.	  federal	  government	  has	  granted	  more	  than	  $470	  billion	  to	  the	  oil	  and	  gas	  industry	  in	  the	  form	  of	  permanent	  tax	  breaks.	  (Other	  countries	  subsidize	  their	  oil	  and	  gas	  industries	  as	  well,	  and	  the	  WTO	  allows	  it.)	  Although	  the	  United	  States	  still	  subsidizes	  fossil	  fuels,	  renewable	  energies	  now	  receive	  larger	  national	  subsidies	  on	  a	  yearly	  basis.	  A	  2014	  Mother	  
Jones	  report	  found	  that	  U.S.	  taxpayers	  subsidize	  the	  fossil	  fuel	  industry	  by	  as	  much	  as	  $4.8	  billion	  a	  year,	  whereas	  renewable	  energies	  are	  granted	  $7.3	  billion	  a	  year.80	  However,	  on	  a	  global	  scale,	  fossil	  fuels	  received	  $493	  billion	  in	  subsidies	  in	  2014,	  more	  than	  four	  times	  the	  value	  of	  the	  subsidies	  renewable	  energies	  received,	  according	  to	  the	  International	  Energy	  Agency.81	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   The	  second	  reason	  why	  renewable	  energy	  subsidies	  are	  essential	  to	  help	  keep	  the	  industry	  going	  is	  that	  even	  though	  renewables	  are	  now	  cost-­‐competitive	  with	  fossil	  fuels,	  the	  infrastructure	  of	  most	  nations	  favors	  fossil	  fuel	  use.	  For	  example,	  the	  United	  States,	  as	  is	  the	  case	  with	  other	  nations,	  has	  a	  highway	  system,	  power	  grid	  system,	  regulatory	  system,	  and	  combustion	  engine-­‐centric	  fueling	  system	  all	  designed	  for	  fossil	  fuel	  use.82	  Energy	  expert	  Kate	  Gordon	  notes,	  “These	  massive	  infrastructure	  projects	  were	  built	  up	  with	  public-­‐sector	  support,	  including	  tax	  credits,	  low-­‐cost	  loans,	  and	  outright	  grants	  from	  the	  federal	  government.	  Companies	  designing	  new	  energy	  sources,	  in	  contrast,	  often	  have	  to	  build	  their	  own	  infrastructure	  and	  factor	  it	  into	  their	  costs.”83	  Thus,	  without	  adequate	  renewable	  energy	  subsidies,	  the	  world	  has	  little	  hope	  of	  addressing	  the	  challenges	  of	  climate	  change.	  Unless	  nations	  around	  the	  world	  agree	  to	  create	  exceptions	  for	  renewable	  energy	  under	  fair	  and	  equal	  treatment	  WTO	  laws,	  governments	  may	  look	  at	  cases	  like	  Ontario	  and	  India	  and	  decide	  that	  passing	  laws	  to	  subsidize	  renewables	  are	  not	  even	  worth	  it	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  	   In	  his	  research	  on	  WTO	  subsidies,	  Steve	  Charnowitz	  writes:	  	   First,	  the	  current	  limits	  on	  subsidies	  in	  the	  SCM	  Agreement	  do	  not	  take	  into	  	   account	  any	  policy	  justification	  for	  a	  subsidy.	  This	  means	  that	  a	  subsidy	  	   justified	  as	  economically	  rational	  does	  not	  get	  any	  legal	  deference	  reflecting	  	   that	  policy	  value,	  even	  when	  the	  subsidy	  produces	  positive	  spillovers	  that	  	   benefit	  the	  global	  community.	  So	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  government	  intervenes	  in	  an	  	   existing	  market	  "to	  correct	  market	  distortions	  therein"	  does	  not	  provide	  a	  	   legal	  excuse	  to	  use	  what	  would	  otherwise	  be	  illegal	  under	  WTO	  rules.84	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  Applying	  this	  observation	  to	  the	  environmental	  discussion	  at	  hand,	  this	  means	  that	  it	  does	  not	  matter	  whether	  or	  not	  subsidizing	  renewable	  energy	  companies	  would	  serve	  to	  correct	  the	  market	  distortions	  governments	  have	  caused	  by	  subsidizing	  fossil	  fuels	  throughout	  the	  past	  decades	  to	  the	  present.	  Given	  that	  the	  WTO	  proclaims	  itself	  to	  be	  primarily	  concerned	  with	  free	  trade,	  this	  fact	  is	  important	  to	  emphasize.	  In	  the	  energy	  industry,	  it	  turns	  out	  that	  there	  has	  never	  been	  such	  a	  thing	  as	  a	  free	  market	  after	  all.	  	  	   However,	  the	  WTO’s	  founding	  agreement	  does	  recognize	  sustainable	  development	  as	  a	  core	  principle.	  The	  1995	  Preamble	  to	  the	  Marrakesh	  Agreement	  Establishing	  the	  World	  Trade	  Organization	  states	  that	  WTO	  members	  acknowledge,	  	  	   their	  relations	  in	  the	  field	  of	  trade	  and	  economic	  endeavor	  should	  be	  	   conducted	  with	  a	  view	  to	  raising	  standards	  of	  living,	  ensuring	  full	  	   employment	  and	  a	  large	  and	  steadily	  growing	  volume	  of	  real	  income	  and	  	   effective	  demand,	  and	  expanding	  the	  production	  of	  and	  trade	  in	  goods	  and	  	   services,	  while	  allowing	  for	  the	  optimal	  use	  of	  the	  world’s	  resources	  in	  	   accordance	  with	  the	  objective	  of	  sustainable	  development…85	  	  Charnowitz	  recommends	  that,	  in	  light	  of	  this	  commitment	  to	  sustainable	  development,	  WTO	  members	  need	  to	  examine	  whether	  SCM	  rules	  “are	  optimal	  for	  achieving	  the	  dual	  goals	  of	  environmental	  protection	  and	  open	  trade”,	  concluding	  that	  right	  now,	  “current	  rules	  are	  not	  optimal.”86	  Unfortunately,	  re-­‐evaluating	  the	  SCM	  rules	  in	  relation	  to	  environmental	  subsidies	  is	  not	  currently	  a	  topic	  of	  discussion	  in	  WTO	  negotiations.	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D.	  Ethyl	  Corporation	  vs.	  Canada	  	   This	  last	  case	  illustrates	  how	  corporations	  can	  use	  ISDS	  mechanisms	  to	  intimidate	  governments,	  even	  without	  relying	  on	  an	  official	  arbitration	  ruling.	  	  	   In	  the	  April	  of	  1997,	  the	  Canadian	  Parliament	  banned	  the	  import	  and	  interprovincial	  transport	  of	  the	  gasoline	  additive	  methylcyclopentadienyl	  manganese	  tri-­‐carbonyl	  (MMT),	  which	  is,	  like	  MTBE,	  an	  octane	  enhancer.87	  After	  Canada	  phased	  out	  leaded	  gasoline,	  MMT	  was	  used	  in	  roughly	  90%	  of	  gasoline	  in	  the	  country.	  88However,	  many	  public	  health	  scientists	  consider	  MMT	  to	  be	  dangerous	  to	  public	  health	  because	  it	  contains	  manganese,	  “a	  potent	  neurotoxin	  when	  inhaled.”89	  Automobile	  manufacturers	  also	  argued	  that	  MMT	  causes	  damage	  to	  emissions	  diagnostics	  and	  control	  equipment	  in	  cars,	  thereby	  increasing	  fuel	  emissions.90	  For	  these	  reasons,	  the	  state	  of	  California	  imposed	  a	  total	  ban	  on	  the	  use	  of	  manganese	  additives	  in	  unleaded	  gasoline	  in	  1976.91	  Additionally,	  the	  U.S.	  Congress	  passed	  an	  amendment	  to	  the	  Clean	  Air	  Act	  in	  1977	  that	  prohibited	  the	  use	  of	  manganese	  additives	  in	  unleaded	  gasoline	  unless	  the	  Environmental	  Protection	  Agency	  (EPA)	  granted	  a	  waiver.	  Ethyl	  Corporation	  (today	  called	  the	  Afton	  Chemical	  Corporation),	  the	  same	  U.S.	  company	  that	  invented	  leaded	  gasoline,	  is	  the	  sole	  producer	  of	  MMT,	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and	  it	  actively	  promotes	  MMT	  use	  in	  many	  developing	  countries.	  It	  requested	  waivers	  from	  the	  EPA	  multiple	  times	  but	  was	  denied.	  After	  the	  most	  recent	  waiver	  request	  in	  1994,	  the	  EPA	  believed	  that	  Ethyl	  had	  demonstrated	  that	  MMT	  did	  not	  damage	  emissions	  control	  devices	  in	  automobiles,	  but	  the	  agency	  still	  denied	  the	  waiver	  because	  of	  uncertainty	  about	  MMT’s	  impact	  on	  public	  health.	  	  In	  response,	  Ethyl	  sued	  the	  EPA	  and	  won,	  because	  the	  EPA	  does	  not	  have	  the	  authority	  to	  refuse	  waivers	  based	  on	  public	  health	  concerns.	  Today,	  the	  EPA	  mandates	  that	  fuel	  contain	  no	  more	  than	  1/32	  grams	  of	  manganese	  per	  gallon	  in	  the	  United	  States.92	  	  	   Along	  with	  these	  bans	  and	  regulations,	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  MMT	  use	  is	  not	  necessary	  in	  the	  production	  of	  fuel.	  According	  to	  the	  EPA,	  “…the	  oil	  industry	  in	  the	  United	  States	  has	  been	  able	  to	  provide	  very	  clean,	  high-­‐quality	  and	  low-­‐emission	  fuel	  which	  meets	  the	  performance	  requirements	  of	  the	  vehicle	  industry	  —	  including	  octane	  —	  without	  the	  use	  of	  MMT.”93	  Many	  other	  countries	  either	  do	  not	  rely	  on	  or	  have	  effectively	  banned	  MMT	  in	  their	  fuels	  as	  well,	  including	  New	  Zealand,	  Germany,	  and	  Japan.	  	  	   In	  response	  to	  Canada’s	  MMT	  ban,	  Ethyl	  filed	  an	  arbitration	  dispute	  under	  NAFTA	  against	  the	  Canadian	  government	  a	  few	  days	  after	  the	  legislature	  passed	  the	  ban	  (a	  threat	  the	  company	  made	  while	  the	  Parliament	  was	  debating	  the	  ban).	  Ethyl	  argued	  that	  the	  MMT	  ban	  violated	  NAFTA’s	  Chapter	  11	  requirement	  of	  national	  treatment	  (Article	  1102),	  prohibition	  of	  expropriation	  (Article	  1110),	  and	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prohibition	  of	  performance	  requirements	  (Article	  1106).94	  Ethyl	  sought	  $251	  million	  in	  damages	  “to	  cover	  losses	  resulting	  from	  the	  ‘expropriation’	  of	  both	  its	  MMT	  production	  plant	  and	  its	  ‘good	  reputation.’”95	  This	  was	  the	  highest	  investor-­‐state	  dispute	  claim	  ever	  submitted	  to	  the	  ICSID	  at	  the	  time.	  	  	   The	  pressure	  of	  this	  significant	  potential	  liability	  persuaded	  the	  Canadian	  government	  to	  agree	  to	  pay	  an	  out-­‐of-­‐court	  settlement	  of	  $13	  million	  to	  Ethyl	  on	  July	  20,	  1998,	  before	  the	  arbitration	  panel	  issued	  a	  ruling.	  In	  comparison,	  Environment	  Canada,	  the	  government’s	  environmental	  agency,	  had	  a	  total	  budget	  of	  roughly	  $11	  million	  that	  same	  year.	  The	  Canadian	  government	  also	  had	  to	  issue	  a	  statement	  for	  Ethyl	  to	  use	  in	  advertising	  stating	  that	  “…	  ‘current	  scientific	  information’	  did	  not	  demonstrate	  MMT’s	  toxicity	  or	  that	  MMT	  impairs	  functioning	  of	  automotive	  diagnostic	  systems.”96	  	  	  
Case	  Analysis	  	   Ethyl’s	  claim	  is	  similar	  in	  many	  ways	  to	  Methanex’s	  unsuccessful	  claim	  against	  the	  United	  States	  in	  the	  earlier	  case	  study.	  The	  arbitration	  panel	  may	  have	  used	  an	  identical	  line	  of	  reasoning,	  that	  because	  Canada	  banned	  all	  MMT,	  it	  was	  not	  discriminating	  against	  any	  particular	  state.	  But	  the	  Methanex	  case	  occurred	  after	  Canada	  settled	  with	  Ethyl,	  so	  there	  was	  no	  way	  that	  the	  precedent	  of	  the	  Methanex	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case	  could	  have	  given	  the	  Canadian	  government	  insight	  about	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  Ethyl	  case.	  	  	   First	  and	  foremost,	  Ethyl’s	  case	  against	  Canada	  demonstrates	  how	  arbitration	  disputes	  can	  be	  used	  to	  intimidate	  states	  into	  rescinding	  regulations	  that	  may	  be	  in	  the	  best	  interest	  of	  the	  environment	  and	  the	  health	  of	  the	  public.	  As	  the	  following	  excerpts	  from	  English	  transcripts	  of	  the	  Canadian	  Parliament’s	  debate	  regarding	  whether	  to	  ban	  MMT	  illustrate,	  even	  the	  mere	  threat	  of	  an	  arbitration	  dispute	  is	  enough	  to	  give	  some	  legislators	  pause	  at	  enacting	  certain	  environmental	  regulations:	  
Mr.	  Benoît	  Sauvageau	  (Terrebonne,	  Bloc	  Quebecois	  party):	  	  
In	  February,	  the	  Minister	  for	  International	  Trade	  wrote	  to	  his	  colleague,	  the	  environment	  
minister,	  to	  warn	  him	  that	  Bill	  C-­‐29,	  which	  prohibits	  the	  importation	  of	  MMT,	  runs	  totally	  
contrary	  to	  Canada's	  obligations	  under	  NAFTA	  and	  the	  WTO.	  
Considering	  that	  Ethyl	  Corp.	  is	  about	  to	  make	  a	  $275	  million	  claim	  under	  NAFTA	  if	  Bill	  C-­‐29	  is	  
passed,	  can	  the	  minister	  tell	  us	  how	  he	  will	  ensure	  that	  Canada	  will	  win	  its	  case	  before	  
NAFTA?	  
Hon.	  Arthur	  C.	  Eggleton	  (Minister	  for	  International	  Trade,	  Liberal	  party.):	  Mr.	  Speaker,	  the	  
government	  is	  proceeding	  with	  Bill	  C-­‐29	  for	  many	  different	  reasons.	  We	  will	  defend	  our	  
position	  with	  respect	  to	  NAFTA.	  Just	  because	  they	  put	  in	  a	  claim	  does	  not	  mean	  they	  will	  be	  
successful.	  
Mr.	  Benoît	  Sauvageau	  (Terrebonne,	  BQ):	  Mr.	  Speaker,	  is	  the	  minister	  telling	  us	  that,	  if	  the	  
federal	  government	  goes	  ahead	  with	  Bill	  C-­‐29,	  in	  spite	  of	  his	  department's	  warnings,	  it	  could	  
end	  up	  having	  to	  pay	  Ethyl	  Corp.	  $275	  million	  coming	  from	  Canadian	  taxpayers?	  
Hon.	  Sergio	  Marchi	  (Minister	  of	  the	  Environment,	  Lib.):	  Mr.	  Speaker,	  this	  government	  is	  
convinced	  that	  for	  many	  reasons	  Bill	  C-­‐29	  is	  in	  the	  best	  interests	  of	  Canadians,	  both	  
environmentally	  and	  healthwise.	  
Second,	  Ethyl	  Corp.	  is	  entitled	  to	  its	  opinion.	  Are	  you	  suggesting	  that	  a	  U.S.	  multi-­‐	  
The	  Speaker:	  Colleagues,	  always	  address	  the	  Chair	  in	  your	  answers.	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Mr.	  Marchi:	  …Is	  the	  member	  suggesting	  that	  a	  U.S.	  multinational	  corporation	  should	  dictate	  
what	  the	  Government	  of	  Canada	  should	  do	  in	  the	  best	  interests	  of	  Canadians,	  both	  
environmentally	  and	  healthwise?	  Our	  answer	  to	  that	  is	  a	  clear	  no.97	  	   Sauvageau	  is	  clearly	  concerned	  about	  Ethyl’s	  threat	  of	  a	  trade	  arbitration	  lawsuit	  and	  views	  this	  as	  a	  reason	  not	  to	  pursue	  the	  MMT	  ban.	  The	  threat	  of	  the	  lawsuit	  accomplished	  its	  intended	  effect	  at	  scaring	  some	  legislators	  away	  from	  supporting	  the	  ban,	  just	  as	  the	  actual	  arbitration	  claim	  intimidated	  the	  government	  to	  reverse	  the	  ban	  and	  pay	  Ethyl	  reparations	  for	  any	  profits	  it	  may	  have	  suffered.	  	  	   But	  not	  all	  legislators	  shared	  Sauvageau’s	  views.	  Among	  them	  was	  Susan	  Whelan:	  	  	  
Ms.	  Susan	  Whelan	  (Essex-­‐Windsor,	  Lib.):	  
Ms.	  Ellen	  Silbergeld	  of	  the	  Environmental	  Defence	  Fund	  served	  on	  the	  EPA	  peer	  review	  
panel	  on	  the	  EPA's	  health	  assessment	  document	  on	  manganese.	  She	  testified:	  
“Regardless	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  MMT	  on	  emissions	  control,	  there	  is	  no	  dispute	  that	  manganese	  
is	  neurotoxic	  to	  humans.	  It	  is	  on	  this	  basis	  that	  EPA	  should	  deny	  this	  waiver.	  Particularly	  
since	  Ethyl	  has	  yet	  again	  failed	  to	  provide	  evidence	  on	  two	  critical	  points.	  One,	  that	  the	  use	  
of	  MMT	  will	  not	  affect	  human	  health	  and	  two,	  that	  the	  use	  of	  MMT	  will	  not	  measurably	  add	  
to	  the	  environmental	  loading	  of	  manganese	  in	  critical	  compartments	  directly	  related	  to	  
human	  exposure.”	  
	  
We	  cannot	  ignore	  this	  evidence.	  We	  must	  act	  with	  prudence.	  I	  am	  equally	  concerned	  that	  
we	  must	  act	  now	  rather	  than	  regret	  our	  inaction	  later…	  
	  
Finally,	  my	  message	  to	  Ethyl	  Corporation	  is	  that	  this	  government	  does	  not	  respond	  to	  
corporate	  threats	  and	  it	  is	  the	  Government	  of	  Canada	  that	  sets	  policy	  in	  this	  country,	  not	  
U.S.	  corporations.98	  
	  	   In	  the	  end,	  Whelan	  proved	  to	  be	  wrong.	  Because	  of	  the	  relatively	  new	  investor-­‐state	  arbitration	  system	  set	  in	  place	  under	  NAFTA,	  a	  U.S.	  corporation	  really	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  97	  “Canada	  House	  of	  Commons	  Parliamentary	  Record,”	  Parliament	  of	  Canada,	  September	  25,	  1996,	  http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=2332613.	  98	  Ibid.	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can	  shape	  policy	  in	  Canada.	  This	  fact	  further	  solidifies	  the	  power-­‐based	  critique	  that	  the	  other	  cases	  have	  developed.	  From	  an	  economic	  perspective,	  the	  Canadian	  government	  would	  have	  had	  much	  to	  lose	  from	  an	  arbitration	  ruling	  in	  Ethyl’s	  favor.	  Ethyl,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  had	  far	  less	  to	  risk	  and	  much	  more	  to	  gain	  from	  a	  ruling;	  if	  the	  arbitration	  court	  did	  happen	  to	  rule	  against	  Ethyl,	  it	  would	  probably	  have	  had	  to	  pay	  Canada’s	  legal	  fees,	  but	  certainly	  not	  the	  hundreds	  of	  millions	  of	  dollars	  Ethyl	  was	  asking	  for.	  Furthermore,	  the	  functioning	  of	  Ethyl	  as	  a	  corporation	  depends	  on	  MMT	  significantly	  more	  than	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  Canadian	  government	  depends	  on	  MMT.	  To	  put	  things	  in	  perspective:	  Ethyl’s	  $251	  million	  claim	  against	  Canada	  is	  the	  same	  amount	  as	  22	  years	  of	  funding	  for	  Environment	  Canada	  at	  its	  1998	  funding	  level.	  With	  this	  in	  mind,	  it’s	  easy	  to	  understand	  how	  Canadian	  government	  officials	  who	  care	  about	  the	  environment	  thought	  that	  the	  risk	  of	  having	  to	  pay	  a	  $251	  million	  claim	  to	  Ethyl	  was	  simply	  too	  gargantuan.	  With	  the	  incentives	  skewed	  for	  and	  against	  each	  party	  in	  this	  way,	  Canada’s	  settlement	  with	  Ethyl	  makes	  sense	  from	  a	  power-­‐based	  perspective.	  Once	  again,	  ‘power’	  in	  arbitration	  is	  not	  defined	  solely	  by	  how	  many	  resources	  the	  parties	  have	  at	  their	  disposal,	  but	  also	  by	  how	  much	  of	  those	  resources	  parties	  are	  willing	  to	  expend	  on	  a	  particular	  case.	  Canada’s	  settlement	  with	  Ethyl	  is	  a	  prime	  example	  of	  this.	  	  	  	   	  	   Meanwhile,	  the	  economic-­‐rationalist,	  cultural-­‐sociological,	  and	  constitutionalization	  models	  do	  not	  offer	  as	  much	  insight	  into	  this	  case.	  These	  models	  focus	  on	  how	  arbitration	  rulings	  bolster	  international	  legitimacy	  and	  efficiency,	  how	  rulings	  are	  shaped	  by	  the	  culture	  of	  arbitrators,	  and	  how	  rulings	  become	  constitutionalized	  within	  the	  international	  system,	  respectively	  —	  but	  there	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was	  never	  a	  ruling	  in	  this	  case.	  If	  anything,	  this	  case	  demonstrates	  how	  the	  economic-­‐rationalist	  model	  again	  falls	  short	  in	  its	  analysis	  of	  arbitration;	  instead	  of	  serving	  to	  enforce	  clarity	  and	  efficiency	  for	  both	  sides	  in	  trade	  disputes,	  the	  system	  for	  settling	  such	  disputes	  is	  circumvented	  by	  the	  power	  inequities	  present	  within	  that	  very	  system.	  After	  all,	  if	  the	  parties	  had	  gone	  through	  with	  arbitration,	  then	  perhaps	  Canada	  would	  have	  been	  successful	  in	  upholding	  its	  ban	  on	  MMT,	  just	  as	  the	  United	  States	  was	  in	  upholding	  its	  MTBE	  regulations.	  	  	  	   Regarding	  constitutionalization,	  however,	  the	  Ethyl	  vs.	  Canada	  case	  does	  set	  a	  different	  sort	  of	  precedent	  outside	  of	  the	  legal	  realm:	  if	  a	  particular	  government	  tries	  to	  inflict	  a	  regulation	  affecting	  company	  profits,	  then	  corporations	  can	  file	  an	  inflated	  arbitration	  claim	  against	  the	  government	  to	  intimidate	  them	  into	  repealing	  the	  regulation.	  Along	  with	  this	  precedent,	  an	  equally	  concerning	  implication	  here	  is	  that	  if	  a	  wealthy	  state	  like	  Canada	  can	  be	  intimidated	  in	  repealing	  regulations	  because	  of	  potentially	  costly	  arbitration	  disputes,	  then	  developing	  states	  that	  do	  not	  have	  nearly	  as	  much	  money	  to	  spend	  on	  their	  legal	  infrastructures	  may	  be	  even	  more	  vulnerable	  to	  corporate	  arbitral	  intimidation.	  Notably,	  Philip	  Morris	  International	  filed	  a	  $25	  million	  claim	  in	  2014	  against	  Uruguay	  because	  of	  the	  health	  warning	  labels	  the	  government	  was	  trying	  to	  place	  on	  their	  cigarette	  packages.99	  Uruguay	  said	  they	  would	  have	  already	  had	  to	  drop	  its	  tobacco	  regulations	  if	  former	  New	  York	  mayor	  Michael	  Bloomberg	  had	  not	  donated	  $500,000	  to	  help	  cover	  legal	  fees.	  Arbitral	  intimidation	  can	  take	  the	  form	  of	  a	  mere	  threat	  from	  a	  particular	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  99	  Philip	  Morris	  International,	  “Uruguay	  Bilateral	  Investment	  Treaty	  (BIT)	  Litigation,”	  PMI.com,	  2016,	  http://www.pmi.com/eng/media_center/company_statements/pages/uruguay_bit_claim.aspx.	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corporation	  or	  industry	  rather	  than	  a	  full-­‐blown	  arbitral	  claim,	  and	  sometimes	  the	  threat	  alone	  is	  enough	  to	  stop	  environmental	  and	  health	  regulations	  in	  their	  tracks.	  	  	   For	  example,	  Namibia	  passed	  a	  tobacco	  control	  law	  in	  2010	  that	  aimed	  to	  limit	  tobacco	  advertising	  and	  place	  large	  health	  warnings	  on	  cigarette	  packages,	  but	  three	  years	  later,	  the	  government	  had	  yet	  to	  carry	  out	  a	  single	  major	  provision	  of	  the	  law.	  100	  Tobacco	  companies	  had	  threatened	  to	  file	  arbitration	  disputes	  against	  the	  Namibian	  government;	  fearful	  of	  a	  costly	  legal	  battle,	  the	  Namibian	  government	  backed	  down.	  Bashupi	  Maloboka,	  a	  former	  Health	  Ministry	  official	  in	  Namibia	  who	  helped	  push	  for	  the	  passage	  of	  the	  tobacco	  control	  law,	  said,	  in	  reference	  to	  the	  tobacco	  industry,	  “The	  fear	  is	  that	  they	  have	  the	  money	  and	  they	  have	  the	  resources,	  so	  they	  can	  pay	  for	  anything.”101	  Likewise,	  Togo	  also	  backed	  down	  from	  passing	  a	  tobacco	  control	  law	  in	  2013	  —	  a	  law	  that	  would	  have	  placed	  picture	  warnings	  in	  place	  of	  written	  warnings	  on	  cigarette	  packages,	  as	  40%	  of	  the	  state’s	  population	  is	  illiterate	  —	  because	  of	  threats	  from	  Philip	  Morris.102	  Developing	  states’	  fears	  of	  the	  economic	  costs	  a	  legal	  dispute	  might	  bring	  are	  understandable	  when	  one	  investigates	  the	  economic	  power	  of	  each	  party:	  in	  2013,	  Togo’s	  GDP	  was	  $4.3	  billion,	  
103	  whereas	  Philip	  Morris’	  net	  revenue	  was	  $80	  billion.104	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  100	  Sabrina	  Tavernise,	  “Tobacco	  Firms’	  Strategy	  Limits	  Poorer	  Nations’	  Smoking	  Laws,”	  NYTimes.com,	  December	  13,	  2013,	  http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/13/health/tobacco-­‐industry-­‐tactics-­‐limit-­‐poorer-­‐nations-­‐smoking-­‐laws.html?_r=0.	  101	  Ibid.	  	  102	  Chuck	  Idelson,	  “Trade	  Deals	  Should	  Come	  With	  Their	  Own	  Warnings	  for	  Public	  Health,”	  National	  Nurses	  United,	  February	  18,	  2015,	  http://www.nationalnursesunited.org/blog/entry/trade-­‐deals-­‐should-­‐come-­‐with-­‐their-­‐own-­‐warnings-­‐for-­‐public-­‐health.	  103	  Central	  Intelligence	  Agency,	  “The	  World	  Factbook,”	  CIA.gov,	  https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-­‐world-­‐factbook/geos/to.html.	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   Additionally,	  corporate	  arbitral	  intimidation	  can	  influence	  far	  more	  states	  than	  just	  the	  state	  against	  which	  the	  arbitration	  dispute	  is	  filed.	  Other	  African	  governments	  have	  witnessed	  what	  Namibia	  and	  Uganda	  have	  gone	  through	  and	  may	  be	  reluctant	  to	  put	  their	  own	  states	  through	  the	  same	  legal	  disputes,	  battles	  that	  they	  often	  cannot	  afford	  because	  of	  lack	  of	  money	  and/or	  specialized	  legal	  expertise.	  Once	  again,	  the	  power-­‐based	  emphasis	  on	  how	  the	  economic	  strength	  of	  states	  and	  corporations	  affects	  how	  each	  party	  responds	  to	  arbitration	  cannot	  go	  unnoticed.	  	   There	  is	  one	  final	  way	  in	  which	  power	  dynamics	  are	  crucial	  in	  understanding	  the	  inequities	  arbitration	  sometimes	  causes:	  cases	  like	  Canada’s	  shift	  power	  dynamics	  between	  states	  and	  corporations	  by	  violating	  the	  precautionary	  principle,	  which	  demands	  that,	  if	  whether	  a	  product	  causes	  some	  kind	  of	  harm	  is	  unclear,	  then	  the	  burden	  is	  on	  the	  corporation	  manufacturing	  the	  product	  to	  prove	  that	  it	  is	  not	  harmful.105	  Until	  then,	  the	  government	  has	  the	  right	  to	  protect	  its	  citizens	  by	  regulating	  or	  banning	  the	  product	  as	  it	  sees	  fit.	  In	  short,	  scientific	  uncertainty	  of	  a	  product’s	  safety	  should	  not	  disqualify	  the	  government	  from	  taking	  precautionary	  measures	  to	  protect	  the	  public	  from	  the	  product	  in	  question.	  	  	   There	  are	  many	  examples	  of	  the	  precautionary	  principle	  in	  international	  law.	  The	  World	  Charter	  for	  Nature,	  adopted	  by	  the	  UN	  General	  Assembly	  in	  1982,	  stands	  as	  the	  first	  international	  recognition	  of	  this	  principle.	  Additionally,	  the	  1987	  Montreal	  Protocol	  and	  the	  1992	  Rio	  Declaration	  on	  the	  Environment	  both	  draw	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  104	  Stock	  Analysis	  on	  Net,	  “Philip	  Morris	  International	  Inc.:	  Income	  Statement,”	  2016,	  https://www.stock-­‐analysis-­‐on.net/NYSE/Company/Philip-­‐Morris-­‐International-­‐Inc/Financial-­‐Statement/Income-­‐Statement.	  105	  Public	  Citizen,	  “NAFTA	  Chapter	  11	  Investor-­‐to-­‐State	  Cases:	  Bankrupting	  Democracy,”	  10.	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upon	  the	  precautionary	  principle.	  Furthermore,	  the	  European	  Union’s	  Lisbon	  Treaty	  signed	  in	  2007	  states	  in	  paragraph	  2,	  article	  191:	  	  	   Union	  policy	  on	  the	  environment	  shall	  aim	  at	  a	  high	  level	  of	  protection	  taking	  	   into	  account	  the	  diversity	  of	  situations	  in	  the	  various	  regions	  of	  the	  Union.	  It	  	   shall	  be	  based	  on	  the	  precautionary	  principle	  and	  on	  the	  principles	  that	  	   preventive	  action	  should	  be	  taken,	  that	  environmental	  damage	  should	  as	  a	  	   priority	  be	  rectified	  at	  source	  and	  that	  the	  polluter	  should	  pay.106	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  international	  norm	  of	  the	  precautionary	  principle,	  situations	  like	  the	  ones	  explored	  in	  this	  case	  analysis	  prevent	  states	  from	  applying	  this	  principle	  to	  protect	  the	  populations	  they	  are	  responsible	  for	  governing.	  As	  Carol	  Browner,	  the	  EPA	  Administrator	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Court	  of	  Appeals	  ruling	  against	  the	  EPA,	  said,	  “The	  American	  public	  should	  not	  be	  used	  as	  a	  laboratory	  to	  test	  the	  safety	  of	  MMT.”107	  Nor	  should	  any	  other	  country,	  for	  that	  matter.	  	  	  
V.	  A	  Comprehensive	  Power-­‐Based	  Model	  	  	   The	  case	  studies	  in	  this	  paper	  demonstrate	  three	  ways	  in	  which	  states	  and	  corporations	  can	  use	  international	  trade	  arbitration	  to	  bring	  down	  environmental	  programs	  and	  regulations:	  
	  
1.	  Corporations	  can	  use	  ISDS	  mechanisms	  to	  delay	  or	  avoid	  paying	  damage	  
claims	  from	  victims	  of	  pollution	  in	  other	  states.	  (Ecuador	  vs.	  Chevron)	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  106	  “Treaty	  of	  Lisbon,”	  European	  Union	  Law,	  December	  13,	  2007,	  http://eur-­‐lex.europa.eu/legal-­‐content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:12012E/TXT.	  107	  John	  H.	  Cushman	  Jr.,	  “E.P.A.	  Accuses	  A	  Company	  Of	  Distortion,”	  NYTimes.com,	  March	  8,	  1996,	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2.	  Corporations	  can	  use	  arbitration	  claims	  to	  intimidate	  states	  into	  repealing	  
environmental	  regulations	  or	  to	  prevent	  the	  passing	  of	  such	  regulations	  
altogether.	  (Ethyl	  vs.	  Canada)	  
	  
	  
3.	  States	  can	  use	  WTO	  rules	  to	  shut	  down	  the	  renewable	  energy	  programs	  of	  
other	  states	  with	  which	  they	  are	  competing.	  (EU	  and	  Japan	  vs.	  Canada)	  	  This	  state	  of	  affairs	  is	  problematic	  for	  a	  number	  of	  reasons.	  	  	   First,	  it	  means	  that	  victims	  of	  extreme	  environmental	  pollution	  have	  a	  reduced	  chance	  of	  attaining	  justice	  through	  this	  kind	  of	  system,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  the	  Ecuador	  vs.	  Chevron	  case.	  	  	   Second,	  it	  means	  that,	  at	  a	  time	  when	  climate	  change	  presents	  a	  severe	  long-­‐term	  threat	  to	  states	  across	  the	  globe,	  environmental	  programs	  that	  would	  help	  transition	  societies	  away	  from	  fossil	  fuel	  dependence	  are	  being	  shut	  down,	  as	  in	  the	  EU	  and	  Japan	  vs.	  Canada	  case.	  This	  is	  a	  particularly	  crucial	  point	  to	  stress,	  for	  getting	  such	  progressive	  renewable	  energy	  programs	  passed	  on	  a	  national	  level	  can	  be	  enough	  of	  a	  challenge	  in	  itself.	  As	  Robert	  D.	  Putnam	  notes	  in	  his	  theory	  of	  two-­‐level	  games	  in	  international	  diplomacy,	  states	  are	  always	  made	  up	  of	  various	  competing	  constituencies.108	  In	  international	  relations	  theory,	  scholars	  often	  refer	  to	  states	  as	  if	  they	  were	  cohesive	  units	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  simplicity,	  but	  one	  should	  always	  be	  aware	  of	  the	  complexities	  Putnam	  rightly	  observes	  behind	  this	  idea	  of	  uniform	  state	  interests.	  For	  example,	  the	  United	  States	  has	  declared	  its	  commitment	  to	  combatting	  climate	  change	  by	  signing	  onto	  the	  Paris	  Agreement.	  However,	  one	  of	  the	  key	  constituencies	  in	  the	  United	  States	  is	  the	  Republican	  Party,	  a	  party	  that	  has	  the	  climate	  change	  denial	  as	  a	  core	  component	  of	  its	  platform.	  In	  effect,	  the	  Democratic-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  108	  Robert	  D.	  Putnam,	  “Diplomacy	  and	  Domestic	  Politics:	  The	  Logic	  of	  Two-­‐Level	  Games,”	  (International	  Organization	  42,	  no.	  3,	  Summer	  1988),	  427-­‐460.	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controlled	  Executive	  Branch	  has	  been	  forced	  to	  carry	  out	  the	  nation’s	  efforts	  to	  reduce	  fossil	  fuel	  emissions,	  because	  the	  Republican-­‐controlled	  Congress	  refuses	  to	  pass	  legislation	  leading	  to	  a	  renewable	  energy	  transition.	  Although	  most	  other	  states	  do	  not	  have	  to	  endure	  such	  an	  extreme	  situation	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  denial	  of	  climate	  change,	  there	  are	  plenty	  of	  constituencies	  around	  the	  world	  (most	  notably,	  the	  fossil	  fuel	  companies	  themselves)	  lobbying	  states	  to	  resist	  enacting	  new	  environmental	  policies.	  	  	   Third,	  these	  findings	  mean	  that,	  as	  multinational	  corporations	  continue	  to	  grow	  in	  wealth	  and	  power,	  we	  can	  expect	  these	  arbitral	  clashes	  with	  the	  environment	  to	  continue	  if	  no	  attempts	  at	  reforming	  this	  system	  are	  made.	  After	  all,	  many	  of	  the	  arbitral	  claims	  noted	  in	  this	  study	  are	  relatively	  recent,	  and	  corporations	  who	  can	  benefit	  from	  such	  international	  legal	  tactics	  in	  protecting	  their	  profits	  will	  surely	  take	  note.	  	  	   In	  light	  of	  these	  problems,	  I	  will	  now	  present	  a	  comprehensive	  power-­‐based	  model	  of	  international	  trade	  arbitration,	  building	  on	  key	  insights	  from	  the	  case	  studies	  and	  all	  four	  of	  the	  arbitration	  models	  presented	  so	  far	  (See	  Figure	  3	  on	  pg.	  
71).	  Regarding	  the	  four	  models	  of	  arbitration,	  Mattli	  and	  Dietz	  state,	  “Types	  or	  models	  are	  organizing	  devices	  of	  a	  complex	  reality,	  privileging	  certain	  key	  factors	  over	  others.	  The	  various	  models	  need	  not	  be	  mutually	  exclusive,	  but	  can	  overlap,	  interact,	  or	  even	  inform	  each	  other.”109	  As	  the	  name	  ‘comprehensive	  power-­‐based	  model’	  suggests,	  my	  model	  will	  focus	  on	  incorporating	  the	  other	  models’	  perspectives	  via	  a	  power-­‐based	  framework.	  I	  will	  then	  use	  the	  model	  as	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  109	  Mattli	  and	  Dietz,	  “Mapping	  and	  Assessing	  the	  Rise	  of	  International	  Commercial	  Arbitration	  in	  the	  Globalization	  Era:	  An	  Introduction,”	  6.	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foundation	  for	  identifying	  the	  current	  inequities	  in	  international	  trade	  arbitration	  and	  how	  they	  might	  be	  addressed.	  	  	   At	  its	  heart,	  the	  original	  power-­‐based	  model	  highlights	  the	  power	  inequities	  within	  the	  arbitration	  process	  and	  the	  negative	  externalities	  it	  often	  produces.	  Yet	  despite	  these	  critical	  observations,	  it	  would	  be	  a	  mistake	  to	  not	  mention	  any	  of	  the	  benefits	  arbitration	  contributes	  to	  society,	  or	  to	  conclude	  arbitration	  should	  be	  outlawed	  altogether.	  The	  economic-­‐rationalist	  models	  provides	  crucial	  answers	  as	  to	  why	  structures	  of	  arbitration	  developed	  in	  the	  first	  place	  and	  acknowledges	  some	  of	  the	  positive	  impacts	  of	  arbitration	  upon	  certain	  constituencies.	  As	  previously	  mentioned,	  providing	  avenues	  for	  arbitration	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  increase	  trade	  flows	  between	  countries,	  helping	  spur	  economic	  growth.	  Intuitively,	  this	  makes	  sense,	  for	  the	  more	  assurances	  investors	  have	  regarding	  the	  safety	  of	  their	  investments,	  the	  more	  likely	  they	  will	  be	  to	  invest;	  as	  such,	  arbitration	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  additional	  protection	  for	  foreign	  investors.	  Therefore,	  it	  seems	  that	  certain	  investments	  in	  developing	  countries	  with	  weak	  legal	  systems	  may	  not	  have	  taken	  place	  were	  it	  not	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  international	  arbitration	  systems	  (although,	  as	  Schultz	  and	  Dupont’s	  empirical	  analysis	  of	  investment	  arbitration	  finds,	  this	  mechanism	  is	  surely	  used	  for	  reasons	  other	  than	  a	  substitution	  for	  weak	  legal	  systems).	  Hence,	  a	  comprehensive	  power-­‐based	  model	  realizes	  the	  importance	  of	  arbitration	  in	  the	  global	  economy	  while	  critiquing	  it,	  which	  means	  that	  calling	  for	  an	  end	  to	  ISDS	  mechanisms	  in	  trade	  agreements	  is	  simply	  not	  a	  feasible	  option.	  	  	   On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  cultural-­‐sociological	  model	  inadvertently	  makes	  an	  excellent	  case	  for	  the	  power-­‐based	  model,	  as	  previously	  mentioned.	  The	  culture	  of	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arbitration	  does	  indeed	  tend	  to	  favor	  corporate	  interests	  rather	  than	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  general	  public,	  which	  puts	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  certain	  arbitral	  rulings	  up	  to	  a	  fair	  amount	  of	  debate.	  Again,	  we	  can	  see	  this	  phenomenon	  within	  the	  Trans-­‐Pacific	  Parnternship	  negotiations.	  While	  the	  Office	  of	  the	  United	  States	  Trade	  Representative	  may	  describe	  ISDS	  as	  “a	  neutral,	  international	  arbitration	  procedure”	  that	  provides	  an	  “impartial,	  law-­‐based	  approach	  to	  resolve	  conflicts,”	  110	  the	  setup	  of	  Trans-­‐Pacific	  Partnership	  ISDS	  courts	  would	  be	  far	  from	  neutral,	  given	  that	  the	  courts	  would	  hire	  corporate	  lawyers	  to	  sit	  on	  arbitration	  panels	  instead	  of	  independent	  judges.111	  As	  Senator	  Elizabeth	  Warren	  wrote	  in	  a	  recent	  editorial	  for	  
The	  Washington	  Post,	  “If	  you’re	  a	  lawyer	  looking	  to	  maintain	  or	  attract	  high-­‐paying	  corporate	  clients,	  how	  likely	  are	  you	  to	  rule	  against	  those	  corporations	  when	  it’s	  your	  turn	  in	  the	  judge’s	  seat?”112	  Additionally,	  the	  judges	  on	  ISDS	  courts	  are	  usually	  paid	  $600	  to	  $700	  an	  hour,	  which	  gives	  them	  little	  incentive	  to	  dismiss	  cases.113	  Because	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  arbitration	  process	  in	  these	  courts	  is	  often	  secretive	  and	  lacks	  any	  requirements	  to	  consider	  legal	  precedent	  in	  their	  rulings,	  it	  allows	  the	  lawyers	  serving	  as	  judges	  to	  have	  plenty	  of	  leeway	  to	  make	  creative	  rulings	  in	  favor	  of	  multinational	  corporations.	  As	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  case	  studies	  showed,	  there	  is	  already	  a	  definitive	  bias	  regarding	  which	  international	  laws	  have	  teeth	  (trade	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  Office	  of	  the	  United	  States	  Trade	  Representative,	  Investor-­‐State	  Dispute	  
Settlement.	  111	  Elizabeth	  Warren,	  “The	  Trans-­‐Pacific	  Partnership	  clause	  everyone	  should	  oppose,”	  WashingtonPost.com,	  February	  25,	  2015,	  http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/kill-­‐the-­‐dispute-­‐settlement-­‐language-­‐in-­‐the-­‐trans-­‐pacific-­‐partnership/2015/02/25/ec7705a2-­‐bd1e-­‐11e4-­‐b274-­‐e5209a3bc9a9_story.html.	  112	  Ibid.	  	  113	  The	  Economist,	  The	  arbitration	  game.	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treaties)	  and	  which	  ones	  do	  not	  (environmental	  treaties).	  Cultural-­‐sociological	  research	  indicating	  arbitrators	  have	  certain	  corporate,	  capitalist	  biases	  make	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  sense,	  given	  that	  the	  legal	  technicalities	  of	  the	  international	  agreements	  they	  must	  consider	  in	  their	  rulings	  force	  such	  biases	  upon	  them	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  	   Furthermore,	  while	  some	  constitutionalist	  theorists	  may	  argue	  for	  the	  potential	  incorporation	  of	  public	  policy	  norms	  favoring	  the	  public	  interest	  into	  arbitration	  rulings,	  it	  seems	  more	  likely	  that,	  at	  this	  point	  in	  time,	  it	  is	  the	  corporate	  norm	  of	  favoring	  private	  interests	  over	  public	  ones	  that	  has	  already	  been	  constitutionalized	  within	  international	  agreements,	  and	  by	  extension,	  ISDS	  and	  WTO	  dispute	  mechanisms.	  Critical	  theorists	  may	  use	  the	  constitutionalization	  model	  to	  identify	  common	  constitutionalized	  patterns	  favoring	  corporate	  interests	  above	  all	  else	  and	  illustrate	  the	  real	  dangers	  if	  these	  patterns	  continue	  to	  become	  constitutionalized,	  as	  they	  already	  have	  been	  in	  many	  trade	  forums.	  	  	   The	  power-­‐based	  model	  also	  sheds	  light	  on	  many	  of	  the	  current	  inequities	  within	  the	  arbitration	  system.	  As	  the	  Ecuador	  vs.	  Chevron	  case	  illustrates,	  there	  is	  no	  platform	  in	  international	  trade	  arbitration	  through	  which	  to	  achieve	  justice	  on	  their	  own	  for	  groups	  of	  citizens	  negatively	  affected	  by	  the	  actions	  of	  states	  or	  corporations.	  This	  situation	  becomes	  particularly	  problematic	  when	  citizens	  harmed	  by	  the	  actions	  of	  a	  corporation	  can	  only	  be	  represented	  by	  a	  government	  that	  helped	  to	  enable	  those	  harms.	  Furthermore,	  even	  though	  investment	  arbitration	  mechanisms	  are,	  in	  theory,	  available	  for	  any	  state	  or	  corporation	  to	  use,	  it	  is	  almost	  always	  corporations	  or	  governments	  from	  rich	  states	  that	  use	  them.	  Poor	  states	  are	  often	  the	  defendant	  of	  arbitral	  claims,	  but	  rarely	  ever	  the	  plaintiff.	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Even	  though	  this	  may	  be	  partly	  because	  poorer	  states	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  violate	  trade	  agreements	  they	  have	  signed,	  it	  is	  nevertheless	  evident	  that	  poor	  states	  like	  Togo	  and	  Uruguay	  do	  not	  have	  the	  same	  legal	  expertise	  or	  financial	  resources	  to	  put	  towards	  dealing	  with	  arbitral	  claims	  that	  rich	  corporations	  do.	  	  	   The	  power-­‐based	  model	  indicates	  that	  in	  forums	  like	  the	  WTO,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  keep	  in	  mind	  that	  the	  political	  and	  corporate	  spheres	  in	  many	  countries	  are	  inseparably	  intertwined	  with	  each	  other.	  The	  Japan	  and	  the	  European	  Union,	  for	  example,	  both	  host	  a	  variety	  of	  companies	  with	  strong	  interests	  to	  put	  a	  halt	  to	  any	  government	  programs	  that	  would	  give	  Canadian	  solar	  companies	  a	  competitive	  advantage.	  	   	  	  	   On	  an	  empirical	  level,	  Schultz	  and	  Dupont’s	  study	  of	  541	  investment	  arbitration	  claims	  from	  1972	  to	  2010	  provide	  evidence	  supporting	  power-­‐based	  critiques	  of	  arbitration.	  As	  mentioned	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  paper,	  although	  investment	  arbitration	  was	  used	  primarily	  against	  developing	  countries	  before	  the	  mid-­‐to-­‐late	  1990s,	  claims	  are	  no	  longer	  filed	  almost	  exclusively	  against	  these	  countries.	  The	  researchers	  note	  that	  “nearly	  half	  of	  the	  claims	  are	  brought	  against	  states	  that	  were,	  in	  the	  year	  the	  claim	  was	  filed,	  either	  high-­‐income	  or	  upper-­‐middle	  income	  states	  on	  the	  World	  Bank	  scale.”114	  This	  means	  that	  in	  the	  period	  after	  the	  mid-­‐to-­‐late	  1990s,	  investment	  arbitration	  has	  been	  used	  more	  often	  to	  settle	  disputes	  between	  developed	  countries	  rather	  than	  between	  an	  investor	  from	  a	  developed	  country	  and	  the	  government	  of	  a	  developing	  one.	  In	  isolation,	  this	  finding	  might	  make	  arbitration	  appear	  to	  be	  a	  more	  equitable	  process	  than	  it	  historically	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  114	  Ibid,	  1154-­‐1155.	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had	  been	  up	  until	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1990s.	  However,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  challenges	  to	  environmental	  policies	  via	  arbitration,	  many	  of	  the	  places	  where	  such	  regulations	  are	  being	  challenged	  are	  developed	  countries.	  Wealthier	  countries	  often	  give	  off	  more	  pollution	  than	  poorer	  countries,	  and	  they	  are	  also	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  stronger	  government	  structures	  that	  can	  better	  create	  and	  enforce	  environmental	  regulations.	  Given	  this	  context,	  the	  fact	  that	  arbitration	  claims	  no	  longer	  discriminate	  against	  developing	  countries	  instead	  highlights	  the	  newfound	  legal	  strength	  corporations	  have	  gained	  during	  the	  same	  mid-­‐to-­‐late	  1990s	  period,	  when	  ISDS	  mechanisms	  in	  trade	  deals	  proliferated.	  	  	   Additionally,	  the	  Schultz	  and	  Dupont’s	  study	  found	  that	  the	  investors	  filing	  claims	  were	  from	  high-­‐income	  countries	  (again,	  according	  to	  World	  Bank	  metrics)	  in	  the	  year	  the	  claim	  was	  filed	  in	  88	  percent	  of	  the	  cases	  they	  investigated.	  At	  the	  other	  end	  of	  the	  spectrum,	  the	  home	  state	  of	  the	  investor	  was	  a	  middle-­‐income,	  lower-­‐middle	  income,	  or	  low-­‐income	  country	  only	  3	  percent	  of	  the	  time.	  The	  remaining	  9	  percent	  of	  cases	  was	  when	  the	  investor	  was	  from	  an	  upper-­‐middle	  income	  country.115	  Thus,	  Schultz	  and	  Dupont	  write,	  “The	  shift	  of	  the	  system	  is	  this:	  [investment	  arbitration]	  was	  a	  developed	  vs.	  developing	  instrument;	  it	  now	  is	  a	  developed	  vs.	  developed/developing	  instrument.”116	  Furthermore,	  during	  the	  1998-­‐2010	  (the	  period	  after	  investment	  arbitration	  shifted	  away	  from	  targeting	  developing	  countries),	  high-­‐income	  countries	  were	  1.7	  times	  more	  successful	  in	  winning	  investment	  arbitrations	  cases	  than	  low-­‐income	  countries.	  This	  rate	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  115	  Schultz	  and	  Dupont,	  “Investment	  Arbitration:	  Promoting	  the	  Rule	  of	  Law	  or	  Over-­‐empowering	  Investors?	  A	  Quantitative	  Empirical	  Study,”	  1154-­‐1155.	  	  116	  Ibid,	  1157.	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excludes	  cases	  that	  were	  settled	  before	  an	  arbitration	  ruling	  could	  be	  issued;	  approximately	  30	  percent	  of	  the	  541	  claims	  investigated	  fall	  into	  this	  category.	  Such	  a	  finding	  could	  be	  partly	  attributed	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  legal	  expertise	  to	  handle	  arbitration	  cases	  in	  developing	  countries,	  but	  it	  may	  also	  indicate	  that	  developing	  countries	  are	  just	  more	  likely	  to	  violate	  trade	  norms	  they	  have	  agreed	  to	  than	  developed	  ones.	  The	  reasons	  behind	  this	  statistic	  were	  not	  examined	  in	  the	  study,	  but	  they	  are	  interesting	  to	  consider	  when	  examining	  the	  power	  dynamics	  behind	  international	  arbitration.	  With	  these	  facts	  in	  mind,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  avoid	  the	  conclusion	  that	  investment	  arbitration	  remains	  a	  tool	  almost	  exclusively	  for	  corporations	  or	  governments	  from	  developed	  countries,	  not	  poor	  ones.	  	   An	  even	  more	  concerning	  hypothesis	  that	  emerges	  from	  a	  power-­‐based	  analysis	  of	  the	  case	  studies	  is	  this:	  Wealthy	  states	  may	  be	  able	  to	  keep	  some	  of	  their	  environmental	  regulations	  and	  programs,	  but	  corporations	  will	  dominate	  arbitration	  in	  the	  long-­‐run,	  because	  they	  have	  much	  more	  at	  stake.	  Sometimes	  private	  interests	  will	  be	  willing	  to	  sacrifice	  more	  resources	  on	  arbitration	  proceedings	  than	  states	  are,	  even	  if	  the	  states	  seem	  to	  possess	  more	  political	  and	  economic	  power	  than	  the	  corporations	  do.	  One	  explanation	  for	  this	  is	  that	  a	  corporation	  sometimes	  has	  much	  more	  at	  stake	  in	  an	  arbitration	  ruling	  than	  a	  state	  does;	  therefore,	  the	  corporation	  may	  be	  willing	  to	  expend	  much	  more	  to	  meet	  its	  goal	  than	  governments	  will,	  as	  the	  Ethyl	  vs.	  Canada	  case	  study	  illustrates.	  Regarding	  this	  particular	  case	  study,	  what	  if	  all	  countries	  started	  banning	  MMT	  based	  on	  an	  arbitration	  precedent	  that	  might	  have	  emerged	  from	  that	  dispute?	  Ethyl	  might	  go	  bankrupt.	  No	  matter	  which	  way	  the	  ruling	  turned	  out,	  Canada’s	  very	  existence	  was	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not	  threatened	  by	  the	  outcome	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  Ethyl’s	  very	  existence	  was.	  Additionally,	  on	  an	  individual	  level,	  corporations	  have	  investors	  with	  much	  to	  lose	  if	  the	  corporation	  goes	  bankrupt,	  whereas	  government	  employees	  don’t	  face	  the	  same	  financial	  incentives;	  if	  the	  government	  loses	  a	  case,	  chances	  are,	  the	  government	  employees	  will	  still	  have	  their	  job	  security	  and	  pensions	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  day.	  	  Therefore,	  even	  in	  cases	  when	  the	  government	  has	  more	  political	  and	  economic	  capital	  than	  the	  corporation	  making	  a	  claim,	  it	  may	  be	  unwilling	  to	  use	  that	  capital	  to	  fight	  the	  claim	  in	  question	  and	  choose	  to	  settle	  instead.	  	  	   These	  issues	  concerning	  ISDS	  that	  are	  exposed	  by	  a	  comprehensive	  power-­‐based	  model	  matter	  in	  a	  larger	  context,	  because	  the	  ability	  for	  corporations	  to	  sue	  states	  gives	  corporations	  a	  historically	  unprecedented	  level	  of	  international	  power.	  The	  arbitration	  system	  is	  thus	  a	  factor	  in	  what	  I	  call	  the	  ‘rise	  of	  the	  corporate	  sovereign.’	  Societies	  must	  ensure	  this	  new	  kind	  of	  sovereignty	  is	  balanced	  with	  the	  public	  interest	  of	  civilian	  populations.	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A	  Comprehensive	  Power-­‐Based	  Model	  
How	  this	  study	  modifies	  existing	  theories	  of	  arbitration:	  
Economic-­‐Rationalist	   Cultural-­‐Sociological	   Power-­‐Based	   Constitutionalization	  	  
• There	  must	  be	  some	  forum	  where	  international	  trade	  disputes	  can	  be	  settled.	  	  	  
• Arbitration	  can	  serve	  to	  clarify	  and	  strengthen	  the	  rule	  of	  international	  law.	  	  
	  
• There	  is	  a	  legally	  enshrined	  bias	  of	  enforcing	  trade	  regulations	  over	  environmental	  ones.	  	  
• This	  bias	  has	  created	  an	  arbitration	  culture	  favorable	  to	  corporate	  powers.	  
	  
• Only	  states	  or	  corporations	  can	  use	  arbitration.	  	  	  
• Corporations	  and	  governments	  from	  rich	  states	  are	  the	  parties	  almost	  always	  the	  ones	  filing	  arbitral	  claims,	  not	  poor	  ones.	  	  	  
• Rich	  states	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  win	  arbitral	  cases	  than	  poor	  states.	  	  	  
• Corporations	  can	  be	  more	  willing	  to	  pursue	  claims	  than	  states	  are	  to	  defend	  themselves	  against	  them.	  	  	  
• Corporations	  can	  use	  claims	  to	  intimidate	  other	  states	  into	  repealing	  regulatory	  laws,	  or	  discourage	  them	  from	  passing	  such	  laws	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  
	  
• Corporate	  trade	  interests	  have	  already	  been	  constitutionalized	  in	  the	  international	  trade	  system.	  	  	  
• If	  arbitration	  is	  to	  have	  continued	  international	  legitimacy,	  human	  rights	  and	  environmental	  must	  be	  constitutionalized,	  too.	  	  
	  
Figure	  3	  –	  An	  Overview	  of	  the	  Comprehensive	  Power-­‐Based	  Model	  of	  Arbitration.	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VI.	  Conclusion:	  Pathways	  to	  Reform	  	  
	   Although	  the	  United	  States	  has	  never	  lost	  an	  arbitration	  case	  so	  far,	  this	  trend	  may	  end	  in	  the	  future.	  The	  United	  States	  is	  the	  eighth-­‐largest	  target	  of	  arbitral	  claims	  and	  has	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  15	  claims	  over	  the	  years.117	  The	  Cato	  Institute	  predicts,	  “As	  the	  percentage	  of	  global	  Fortune	  500	  companies	  domiciled	  outside	  the	  Untied	  States	  continues	  to	  increase,	  U.S.	  laws	  and	  regulations	  are	  likely	  to	  come	  under	  greater	  scrutiny.”118	  Hence,	  as	  more	  and	  more	  multinational	  corporations	  realize	  that	  the	  ISDS	  mechanism	  is	  a	  useful	  way	  to	  avoid	  regulations	  and	  paying	  potential	  fines,	  this	  mechanism	  may	  be	  increasingly	  used	  against	  the	  United	  States	  and	  other	  countries.	  In	  response	  to	  this	  situation,	  South	  Africa	  plans	  to	  withdraw	  from	  treaties	  it	  has	  made	  with	  ISDS	  clauses,	  and	  India	  is	  considering	  doing	  the	  same,	  just	  as	  Ecuador	  has	  already	  started	  doing.	  In	  the	  future,	  more	  countries	  may	  consider	  following	  Brazil’s	  long-­‐standing	  example	  of	  refusing	  to	  sign	  any	  trade	  agreement	  that	  includes	  an	  ISDS	  provision.119	  These	  factors	  make	  opening	  the	  discussion	  of	  possible	  solutions	  to	  international	  trade	  arbitration’s	  crisis	  of	  legitimacy	  and	  the	  clashes	  it	  has	  had	  with	  environmental	  policies	  all	  the	  more	  important.	  	   Now,	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  discuss	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  international	  trade	  arbitration	  can	  be	  reformed	  without	  discussing	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  international	  trade	  agreements	  can	  be	  reformed.	  This	  is	  because	  the	  rules	  of	  trade	  arbitrations	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  117	  Daniel	  J.	  Ikenson,	  A	  Compromise	  to	  Advance	  the	  Trade	  Agenda:	  Purge	  Negotiations	  
of	  Investor-­‐State	  Dispute	  Settlement,	  (Cato	  Institute:	  March	  4,	  2014),	  http://www.cato.org/publications/free-­‐trade-­‐bulletin/compromise-­‐advance-­‐trade-­‐agenda-­‐purge-­‐negotiations-­‐investor-­‐state.	  	  118	  Ibid.	  	  119	  The	  Economist,	  The	  arbitration	  game.	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systems	  are	  determined	  by	  such	  agreements.	  Therefore,	  an	  examination	  of	  how	  to	  improve	  the	  arbitration	  process	  must	  also	  be	  an	  examination	  of	  how	  to	  improve	  the	  treaties	  that	  govern	  that	  process.	  	  	   A	  popular	  solution	  to	  the	  inequities	  within	  arbitration	  systems	  is	  to	  do	  away	  with	  the	  systems	  altogether.	  When	  the	  United	  States	  was	  negotiating	  the	  Trans-­‐Pacific	  Partnership	  with	  other	  countries,	  progressive	  U.S.	  members	  of	  Congress,	  such	  as	  Senators	  Bernie	  Sanders	  and	  Elizabeth	  Warren	  and	  Congressman	  Alan	  Grayson,	  objected	  to	  the	  agreement’s	  ISDS	  mechanism.	  Advocacy	  groups	  such	  as	  Public	  Citizen	  have	  also	  been	  long-­‐time	  opponents	  of	  ISDS	  mechanisms	  in	  trade	  agreements.	  Given	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  ISDS	  mechanisms	  have	  been	  used	  to	  hurt	  citizens	  and	  the	  environment,	  the	  objections	  to	  including	  them	  in	  trade	  agreement	  are	  understandable.	  But	  as	  previously	  noted,	  without	  ISDS	  mechanisms,	  there	  would	  be	  no	  way	  to	  clarify	  disputes	  on	  an	  international	  level	  and	  enforce	  agreements	  which	  states	  have	  signed	  onto,	  thus	  weakening	  international	  law.	  That	  is	  why	  I	  contend	  that	  any	  push	  for	  an	  end	  to	  the	  practice	  of	  international	  trade	  arbitration	  is	  fundamentally	  counterproductive	  to	  achieving	  substantive	  reforms	  in	  an	  international	  system	  that	  is	  here	  to	  stay.	  	  	   So,	  what	  are	  ways	  in	  which	  arbitration	  could	  be	  made	  more	  equitable?	  The	  most	  obvious	  reform	  is	  for	  states	  to	  include	  stronger	  environmental	  protections	  in	  future	  trade	  agreements.	  The	  international	  community	  needs	  to	  start	  using	  “shall”	  instead	  of	  “should”	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  environment,	  although	  in	  light	  of	  the	  “should”	  language	  of	  the	  Paris	  Agreement,	  the	  chances	  that	  this	  will	  happen	  on	  a	  large	  scale	  in	  the	  current	  international	  political	  realm	  are	  low.	  Instead	  of	  trying	  to	  
The	  Corporatization	  of	  Justice	   Novak	  75	  
pass	  a	  legally	  binding	  environmental	  treaty	  that	  applies	  to	  all	  nations,	  states	  may	  instead	  find	  it	  more	  productive	  to	  use	  BITs	  or	  other	  smaller	  multilateral	  trade	  platforms	  in	  which	  to	  negotiate,	  or	  renegotiate,	  treaties	  so	  that	  they	  include	  stronger	  environmental	  protections.	  This	  would	  be	  one	  method	  for	  how	  environmental	  norms	  could	  begin	  to	  be	  constitutionalized	  in	  international	  arbitration	  systems.	  This	  would	  allow	  arbitrators	  to	  start	  incorporating	  environmental	  norms	  into	  their	  rulings,	  thereby	  helping	  to	  reshape	  the	  culture	  of	  international	  trade	  arbitration.	  	  	   Because	  of	  the	  clear	  power	  disparities	  regarding	  the	  accessibility	  of	  arbitration	  and	  the	  states	  it	  is	  likely	  to	  benefit,	  the	  international	  community	  should	  work	  to	  establish	  an	  international	  arbitration	  defense	  fund	  for	  poor	  states.	  In	  order	  to	  prevent	  poor	  states	  from	  abusing	  the	  availability	  of	  this	  support,	  the	  use	  of	  the	  fund	  could	  be	  restricted	  to	  arbitration	  cases	  trying	  to	  block	  the	  implementation	  of	  health	  or	  environmental	  regulations	  within	  those	  states.	  The	  World	  Bank,	  which	  manages	  the	  ICSID,	  would	  be	  an	  ideal	  home	  for	  such	  a	  program.	  	  	   Finally,	  there	  should	  be	  a	  platform	  where	  a	  class	  action	  lawsuit	  can	  occur	  in	  international	  arbitration	  that	  doesn’t	  require	  representation	  by	  a	  corporation	  or	  a	  government.	  The	  international	  system	  is	  made	  up	  of	  many	  more	  groups	  than	  just	  states	  or	  corporations,	  and	  if	  we	  truly	  want	  the	  system	  to	  be	  equitable,	  then	  international	  arbitration	  systems	  need	  to	  accommodate	  these	  groups.	  Otherwise,	  we	  will	  have	  more	  cases	  like	  Ecuador,	  where	  an	  oppressed	  people	  must	  be	  represented	  in	  arbitration	  by	  a	  corrupt	  government	  that	  signed	  the	  deal	  with	  the	  oil	  company	  oppressing	  them	  in	  the	  first	  place	  to	  receive	  even	  a	  chance	  at	  justice.	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